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SEA-POWER IN GREEK THOUGHT

As far as I know, the history of the idea of thalassocracy in Greek thought has never been written—a surprising fact. Neither can I deal with it here adequately. But an outline from Herodotus to the Greek source on which Cicero drew may well be attempted for the use of future students.¹

I. Reckoning power in terms of ships is already a feature of the Homeric Catalogue—not an obvious thing (apart from the position of the Catalogue in the *Iliad*), on which I should like to hear more from Homeric scholars.² The *Odyssey* gives an account of a naval power in its description of the Phaeacians: they delight in ships rather than in war, their fault is isolation (not promiscuity in their foreign relations, the usual later criticism of maritime cities). But the poet is somewhat politicizing fairyland. His tale, although largely utilized by philosophers and moralists for contrasting purposes, did not influence the later discussion on sea-power to a noticeable extent. Thalassocracy, as is well known, becomes a clear-cut idea in Herodotus.

¹ The learned friends who helped my paper 'Terra marique' (*Journ. Rom. Stud.* xxxii, 1942, 53) have contributed to this sketch also (I add the names of A. W. Gomme, P. Treves, and A. N. Sherwin-White); but they do not necessarily share my belief that a synthetic survey, however bad, must precede analytic study, however good. Herodotus is quoted in Rawlinson's translation, Thucydides in Jowett's, Isocrates in G. Norlin's (Loeb Library), Plato's *Laws* in A. E. Taylor's (J. M. Dent).

² *Il.* ii. 614 distinguishes sea-power from land-power. F. Jacoby explained 'Die Einschaltung des Schiffkatalogs in die *Ilias*' in *Sitzb. Preuss. Ak.* 1932, 572 ff., but the historical interpretation of the catalogue has hardly progressed since B. Niese (1873) and E. Rohde, *Kl. Schriften*, i. 107 (= *Rh. Museum*, xxxvi, 1881, 570). W. Leaf, *Homer and History*, 1915, though certainly right versus T. W. Allen, *J.H.S.* xxx, 1910, 292 (an article expanded, but not improved, in his book of 1921), is again too conjectural. At the moment *non liquet* is the wisest conclusion. Cf. J. L. Myres, *Who were the Greeks?* 1930, 312.

According to him Polycrates was the first who conceived the design of gaining the empire of the sea, 'unless it were Minos the Cnossian, and those (if there were any such) who had the mastery of the Aegean at an earlier time' (iii. 122). A period of thalassocracy is attributed also to Aegina (v. 83). In the alleged debate at Gelo's court, where the Spartan and Athenian ambassadors are supposed to have come for help (vii. 157 ff.), Gelo asks for the supreme command, but would remain content with the command of the fleet. The Athenians refuse it indignantly: if the Spartans do not want to have it, the Athenians, who have 'raised up a navy greater than that of any other Greek people', are the only ones entitled to the succession. This is a good piece of Athenian retrospective propaganda of the time of the Delian League (cf. vii. 139 and Aesch. *Pers.* 728).¹ I leave aside the list of thalassocracies which Eusebius' *Chronikon* derived from Diodorus (Book VII). Some modern scholars have attributed it to the labours of an unknown Greek historian of the fifth century B.C., and, indeed, any research of that type would fit the fifth century. But I do not see sufficient evidence that the list, as we have it, is earlier than Diodorus' contemporary Castor of Rhodes, whom we know to have composed a treatise on thalassocracies. That Castor and, in general, the scholars of the Alexandrian tradition were able to utilize fifth-century studies on that theme (besides Herodotus and Thucydides) is possible, but not yet supported by proofs.²

¹ The latest discussion is by P. Treves, *Class. Philol.* xxxvi, 1941, 321; but I am not certain, as Treves is, that the embassy to Gelo is not historical. Cf. F. Jacoby, P.-W., Suppl. ii, s.v. 'Herodotus', 453-4.

² For the fifth-century origin of the Eusebian list see especially J. L. Myres, *J.H.S.* xxvi, 1906, 84; xxvii, 1907, 123, and A. R. Burn, *ib.*

In Athens facts had a way of becoming spiritual problems; and Athenian thalassocracy itself underwent searching analysis both in its presuppositions and its effects.¹ The controversy did not remain confined to Athens. The pamphlet of Stesimbrotus of Thasos *On Themistocles, Thucydides, and Pericles* (written after 430 B.C.) was in effect an attack on Athenian sea-power and on Themistocles as a corrupter of the Athenian people (Plut. *Themist.* 4). It is no longer possible to say how much Stesimbrotus depended on contemporary Athenian discussions. The Pseudo-Xenophontean *Constitution of Athens*, which I date between 431 and 425 B.C., with a slight preference for the years 431-430, offers more solid ground.² The writer affirms the relation between sea-power and democracy: as the power of Athens depends on the sea, sailors are inevitably the masters of Athens. He illustrates also the strategic advantages of sea-power over land-power in forming and holding an empire: military campaigns can be organized, enemy trade can be hampered, hostile coalitions can be forestalled much more easily by a naval than by a land power. Above all he knows that sea-power means wealth; and wealth makes de-

mocracy easy. Clearly the author is an oligarchic pessimist who despises Athenian democracy, but recognizes its consistency and strength. He despairs of a change, although he does not consider it impossible, Athens not being an island: if she were, her thalassocracy would be unbreakable. The author says much less than he thinks, but obviously does not believe sea-power compatible with decent government. We shall find this conclusion explicit in Isocrates, *De Pace*. On this, as on many topics, Isocrates seems to derive his argument from the anti-democratic tradition of the fifth century.

II. It would be difficult to prove that Pericles' last speech in Thucydides (ii. 60-4) is directed against the Pseudo-Xenophontean pamphlet, but probably Thucydides knew it,¹ and certainly the set of arguments which Pericles takes for granted, and sweepingly turns to a glorification of the current war, would not have been repudiated by the oligarchic writer. Sea-power is at stake in this war. 'You think that your empire is confined to your allies, but I say that of the two divisions of the world accessible to man, the land and the sea, there is one of which you are absolute masters, and have, or may have, the dominion to any extent which you please.' This sea-power implies tyranny, which it may seem wrong to have assumed, but which it is certainly dangerous to let go—and inglorious, because hatred does not last long, but 'besides the immediate splendour of great actions, the renown of them endures for ever in men's memories'. The speech, clearly written or rewritten after the end of the Peloponnesian War, does not deny one of the main contentions of the oligarchic analysis of Athenian power: the Athenian democracy is a tyranny founded upon sea-power. Yet the glory of that power is assumed to justify acceptance of the consequences. If the oligarch's implicit assumption was that sea-power ought to be given

xlvi, 1927, 165. Contra: W. Aly, *Rh. Mus.* lxxvi, 1911, 585; cf. R. Helm, *Hermes*, lxi, 1926, 241; Kubitschek, P.-W., s.v. 'Kastor', 2355. Relevant also are Jacoby, *FGH* ii D, p. 816; G. Murray, *The Rise of the Greek Epic*, 3rd ed., 1924, 322-6, and H. Winckler, *Der alte Orient*, vii, 1905, 20. Castor's work is mentioned by Suidas (Jacoby, *FGH* 250 T 1).

¹ First direct evidence in Aeschylus, *Pers.* 728, of 472 B.C.

² I think that the pamphlet is later than the first Spartan invasion of Attica and earlier than Brasidas' expedition to Thrace and very probably than Aristophanes' *Knights*; also it is easier to understand if it is earlier than the great plague, although (as H. T. Wade-Gery points out to me) a mention of the plague is not to be expected. For a different view see A. W. Gomme, *Athenian Studies presented to W. S. Ferguson*, 1940, 211 ff., who gives the bibliography (cf. H. Diller, *Gnomon*, 1939, 113-24). On Stesimbrotus F. Jacoby, *FGH* ii D, p. 343, is more persuasive than R. Laqueur, P.-W., s.v. 'Stesimbrotos'. For the relations between Ps.-Xen. and Thucydides the son of Melesias see H. T. Wade-Gery, *J.H.S.* lii, 1932, 208.

¹ In i. 143 Thucydides uses the same argument of the 'island'; in iv. 85. 4 a rejoinder to Ps.-Xen. ii. 5 seems clear.

¹ Cf. R.

up as being related to an immoral form of empire, the implicit conclusion of Pericles (Thucydides) is that the immorality of the Athenian Empire is to be accepted and defended because related to the glory of sea-power.

A remarkable statement in this speech of Pericles is that neither have the Athenians ever reflected on this subject of sea-power, nor has he dealt with it in his previous speeches (ch. 62). Thus in the opinion of Thucydides, if not of Pericles, the argument was fairly new about 430 B.C. I do not suggest that we may conclude from this passage alone that the oligarchic pamphlet was not yet published at that date, but certainly we have here a warning against assuming much earlier literature on the subject.

The argument which in Pericles' speech appears as a direct defence of the Athenian Empire runs also through the introductory chapters of Book I, which I still believe to have been written before 404 B.C.¹ The whole growth of Greece up to the Persian Wars is described in terms of naval power. 'Whereas by land, no conflict of any kind which brought increase of power ever occurred; what wars they had were mere border feuds. Foreign and distant expeditions of conquest the Hellenes never undertook, for they were not as yet ranged under the command of the great states, nor did they form voluntary leagues or make expeditions on an equal footing' (ch. 15). Agamemnon's hegemony during the Trojan War was very similar to the hegemony of Athens in the league. 'It was, as I believe, because Agamemnon inherited this power and because he was the greatest potentate of his time that he was able to assemble the expedition; and the other princes followed him, not from good will, but from fear' (ch. 9). Homer, who had ventured to take the opposite view in *Odyssey*, v. 307, is unceremoniously snubbed. That the older cities were built at a distance from the sea is considered a sign of primitive condi-

tions (ch. 7): the point is important because Plato thought differently. At last, after the first experiment of the Peloponnesian Wars, the Persian Wars introduced land-power on a Panhellenic scale and by implication made possible the divisions of Greece between the land-hegemon and the sea-hegemon. That was the balance of power which, in Alcibiades' opinion, it would have been the interest of the king of Persia to preserve (viii. 46).¹ It is obvious, although never explicitly stated, that Thucydides recognized a strict connexion between the sea-power of Athens and the psychological attitude of the Athenians as described in i. 70 and in Pericles' Funeral Speech; he was also clearly aware that sea-power produces wealth and is the best security against enemies.

III. We may well imagine that much literature attacking Athenian sea-power was produced immediately after 404 B.C., but it is all lost, except, in one sense, the *Gorgias* (cf. 519 A)—and the *I Alcibiades* (cf. 134 B) if it is taken as authentic. But it is typical of the earlier Plato that he does not discuss the material features of Athenian imperialism, while he recognizes navigation as an element of a primitive, healthy, political society (*Rep.* 371 B).² Isocrates evidently polemizes against the literature attacking Athenian sea-power in the great manifesto of the Second Athenian League—the *Panegyricus* (about 380 B.C.). He wants to persuade the Greeks that the first Athenian

¹ See also Thucyd. i. 80-1, 93, 121, 143; iii. 13, 39. —Euripides is unkind to the sailor in *Hec.* 606; *Iph. Aul.* 914 (cf. 450, 517). Aristophanes never disapproved of sea-power and he was in sympathy with the sailor: see for instance *Ach.* 648; *Eq.* 551, 1300; *Vesp.* 1091; *Ran.* 698, 1465, and A. W. Gomme's vigorous paper in *Class. Rev.* lii, 1938, 106-7 (also R. W. Macan, *Herodotus*, 1895, ii. 182 ff.). Sea-power was no problem to him.

² E. Schwartz rightly observed: 'es kann kein Zufall sein, dass weder die Reichspolitik noch der Zusammenbruch Athens in den Diskussionen der Sokratik irgend eine erhebliche Rolle spielen' (*Thukydides*, 2nd ed., 1929, 152). For an analysis of Isocrates, *Paneg.* 100 ff., see Wilamowitz, *Arist. und Athen*, ii. 380 ff. I do not consider texts, like Andocides, *De pace*, which are not direct attacks on sea-power.

¹ Cf. *Riv. Fil. Class.* lxxv, 1937, 284.

Empire was never a tyranny (100 ff.), but does not discuss the typical features of a sea-hegemony and subordinates the whole to his propaganda for a crusade against Persia. In Xenophon's description the new Athenian League reopened the contention over sea-hegemony. The speech of Polydamas of Pharsalus (374 B.C.) presents Jason as meaning to get sea-rule (*Hell.* vi. 1, 10); and in 369 the Spartans are said to have recognized the sea-hegemony of Athens in magnanimous words which, intentionally or not, throw unfavourable light on the subsequent behaviour of Athens (vii. 1 ff.).¹ Criticism of Athenian sea-power became louder again after the Social War (about 357-355 B.C.).² Isocrates, caring little for consistency, but not for the first time critical of Athenian democracy, drew far-reaching consequences. Sea-power is the evil, both for Athens and for Sparta. In the *De pace* of 355 B.C.³ the argument is developed at length. Land-power implies and fosters virtue, but sea-power is definitely demoralizing: it causes injustice, indolence, lawlessness, avarice, covetousness, and is equivalent to tyranny. Look at the Spartans: 'Because of their supremacy on land and of their stern discipline and of the self-control which was cultivated under it, they readily obtained command of the sea, whereas because of the arrogance which was bred in them by that power they speedily lost the supremacy both on land and on sea. For they no longer kept the laws which they had inherited from their ancestors nor remained faithful to the ways which they had followed in times past, but conceived that they were licensed to do whatever they pleased and so were plunged into great confusion' (102-3). The point

(also touched upon in *Antid.* 64; *Phil.* 61) is perhaps better explained by the words of the *Panathenaicus*: 'a land-power is fostered by order and sobriety and discipline and other like qualities; a sea-power is not augmented by these, but by the crafts which have to do with the building of ships and by men who are able to row them—men who have lost their own possessions and are accustomed to derive their livelihood from the possessions of others' (115-16). Renunciation of sea-power, to Isocrates' mind, is the only solution. Xenophon (who, incidentally, excluded sea-power from the horizon of his ideal state in the *Cyropaedia*) offered at least an alternative to the greedy Athenians by his financial scheme in the *Revenues*—a product of the same years and with the same bias.¹ Like the writer of the pamphlet on the Constitution of Athens, Xenophon was aware that imperialism meant wealth, and wanted to persuade the Athenians that they might obtain wealth from peaceful commerce and from their own mines. Isocrates was much more austere: he offered only moral prestige in exchange. But in the *Panathenaicus* he made a partial recantation. Sea-power was described as a necessary evil which Athens had not been able to avoid lest she should become a prey to her enemies. No wonder that Isocrates' pupils were divided on sea-power. Theopompus, of course, was scornful of sailors and maritime cities; Ephorus thought that sea-power has something to do with a good constitution.²

IV. Plato, who had before ruled out sea-power, but had never discussed it, now became eloquent on the subject. The myth of the *Critias* was imagined

¹ I cannot discuss here the purpose of these chapters in Xenophon's mind: cf. *Mem.* iii. 5.

² On the chronology see E. Schweigert, *Hesperia*, viii, 1939, 12.

³ Cf. W. Jaeger, *Athenian Studies* . . . *Ferguson*, 425, n. 1 and the essay mentioned in n. 2. Aelius Aristides wrote a speech with the title 'Isocrates tries to wean the Athenians from their empire of the sea' (*Philostr. Lives of the Sophists*, ii. 9, p. 584 Ol.).

¹ Cf. *Ann. Scuola Normale Superiore Pisa*, s. ii. 5 (1936), 109 ff. (with bibliography).

² On the *Panathenaicus* see the bibliography in Momigliano, *Filippo il Macedone*, 1934, 190. On Theopompus see *FGH* 115 F 62, 281; cf. 100, 105, 114, 204, 233. On Ephorus 70 F 149; cf. 119; also, most significant, Diod. xv. 79, with which cf. Isocr. v. 53; Plut. *Philop.* 14, and Aristid. 33 (*Leuctr.* I), 421, p. 634, Dindorf. (Research on the sources of Aelius Aristides has overlooked these passages: bibl. in A. Boulanger, *Aelius Aristide*, 1923, 281.)

to describe the victory of the ideal State over sea imperialism, though even there navigation is not taken as an evil *ipso facto*. The indictment of navigation is peculiar to the *Laws*. Indeed the verdict of the *Laws* (Book IV) is that a State aiming at peace ought not even to be within sight of the sea lest it should succumb to the sea's temptations. The traffic of a port 'breeds shifty and distrustful habits of soul, and so makes a society distrustful and unfriendly within itself as well as towards mankind at large' (705). The State of the *Laws* is notoriously critical of travels and travellers (949; 952). Furthermore, sea-fighting encourages cowardice, as Homer is said to have noticed already (*Il.* xiv. 96-102). Thus the problem of the choice of the best place for a new State becomes intimately connected with the controversy on Athenian sea-hegemony. In the same passage Plato attacks Athens directly and disparages the battle of Salamis.¹

A famous passage of the *Politics* (vii. 4, p. 1327^a 11), obviously aimed at the *Laws*, waters down Platonic intransigence into typical Aristotelian compromise.² All the evils which Plato enumerated exist (Aristotle admits), but the military and economic advantages of a sea-side town must not be overlooked. If the city is a market only for herself and not for others, the dangers of avarice will be avoided; if the port is separated from the city, being almost another town, unpleasant intercourse will be prevented. Nor must a city renounce a fleet, even a powerful fleet, if she wants to have a hegemonical and political life, but the

sailors should not have rights of citizenship. Perioeci and peasants from her territory will make up the crews. Thus Aristotle, being less strict than Plato about war and wealth, could confirm the condemnation of Athenian sea-power without involving sea-power in general: he avoided the political power of the sailors which had characterized the Athenian democracy. Aristotle's solution seems to have won wide acceptance in Hellenistic thought. It advocated a proper distance of the ideal city from the sea, but left her as many harbours as necessary. The letter of Ps.-Aristeas, which is a description of an ideal State,³ points out that, if Jerusalem is far from the sea and nobly isolated, her State has plenty of good harbours and 'does not suffer for lack of imports by sea' (114). The most important document of the post-Aristotelian tradition is in Cicero's *De Republica*. The passage is well known: 'est autem maritimis urbibus etiam quaedam corruptela et demutatio morum...' (ii. 4. 7). The corruption and misfortunes of Greece are due to the fact that Greek cities are usually by the sea. However, Cicero, like Aristotle, does not repudiate the advantages of a harbour close at hand, and finds merit in Romulus' choice of a position from which 'posset urbs et accipere a mari quo egeret et reddere quo redundaret' (cf. Livy, v. 54. 4 'mari vicinum ad commoditates nec expositum nimia propinquitate ad pericula classium externarum'). Cicero's passage is doubly precious because the comparison with his letter to Atticus, vi. 2. 3, leaves no doubt that his Peripatetic source was Dicaearchus.² In general Hellenistic writers appreciated sea-power,³

¹ On the Salamis-motive in literature, G. Schmitz-Kahlmann, *Das Beispiel d. Geschichte im politischen Denken des Isokrates*, 1939, pp. 77, n. 1; 79, n. 1. Plato probably knew Ps.-Xenoph. *Const. of Athens: Laws* 707 A (Ps.-Xen. i. 2. The alleged Spartan prohibition of navigation (Plut., *Inst. Lac.* 239 E, ch. 42) is a late falsification.

² See especially W. L. Newman, *Polit. of Arist.* i. 317 ff. On Aristotle's judgement of Athenian sea-power, *Pol.* ii. 1274^a15; v. 1304^a20; viii. 1341^a29; *Ab. Pol.* 23 ff. For later biographical discussion of it, Plut. *Themist.* 19 (cf. 4); *Arist.* 22; *Cim.* 5; *Philop.* 14.

¹ Bibliography in W. W. Tarn, *The Greeks in Bactria and India*, 1938, 424 ff.

² On Dicaearchus, F. Egermann, *Sitz. Akad. Wien*, ccxiv. 3, 1932, 51 ff. R. v. Scala, *Stud. d. Polybius*, i, 1890, 233, on Hippodamus' *Περί Πολιτείας* and Cicero must be considered superseded. Pompey, as is well known, was deeply aware of the importance of sea-power (Cic. *ad Att.* x. 8. 4; Plut. *Pomp.* 50; Plin. *N.H.* vii. 98). His son learned from him.

³ Cf. my paper 'Terra marique' in *Journ. Rom. Stud.*, 1942. Cf. also Athen. viii. 334 a, b.

but the prestige of land-power remained greater. The superior moral qualities of a land-power over a sea-power were reaffirmed by Polybius in his comparison between Rome and Carthage (vi. 52), although his arguments do not consider sea-power *per se*.

V. Also a different, non-philosophical, tradition played a part in this limited defence of sea against the attacks of land-minded philosophers: the tradition of the 'encomium'. At least from Sophocles, *Oedipus Col.* 711, or, perhaps better, from Homer onwards (for instance, *Odyss.* xix. 172), the eulogy of a country used to include the eulogy of the sea surrounding it. Even Xenophon in his *Revenues* 3 (where he repeats a commonplace on Attica) glorifies the sea of Attica. This tradition (to be found also in Ephorus' description of Boeotia, *ap.* Strab. ix. 2. 2 = *FGH* 70 F 119 Jac.) obviously influenced Ps.-Aristeas and Cicero, and appears again in the encomia of Rome and Italy by Virgil (*Georg.* ii. 162), Pliny (*N.H.* iii. 41; xxxvii. 201), Aristides (*To Rome* 7), etc. All this encomiastic literature never implied more than an acknowledgement of sea-facilities as one of the advantages offered by the eulogized country and therefore contributed to what we would call the Aristotelian compromise.¹

On the other hand, no important part in this development can be attributed to the usual Graeco-Roman conception that primitive and 'Golden Age' peoples did not know of navigation. The idea of a state of nature either was antithetic to that of a body politic (cf. *Odyssey*, ix. 125, on the Cyclopes) or was meant to describe a condition of happiness without war and trade (as Hesiod, *Works*, 236-7, says

¹ On this encomiastic tradition cf. G. Gernentz, *Laudes Romae*, diss. Rostock, 1918; A. H. Krappe, *Class. Quart.* xx, 1926, 42; L. Castiglioni, 'Le lodi dell' Italia e la visione della piccola Roma pastorale', *Atti II Congresso Studi Romani*, iii (1931), 244 (also, slightly expanded, in *Rend. Ist. Lombardo*, 1931); E. Kiensle, *Der Lobpreis von Städten und Ländern in der älteren griechischen Dichtung*, diss. Basel, 1936, 20 ff., 72. The eulogy of Rome as sea-power in Dionys. Hal., *Ant. Rom.* i. 3, 9 is very interesting.

just men 'do not travel on ships, but grain-giving earth bears them fruit'). In the former case it was presupposed that sea-power was a normal element of a political society; in the latter both sea-power and land-power were eliminated.¹ But of course it is very probable that the idea of a Golden Age without navigation slumbered at the back of the mind of writers like Plato.²

Another point remains to be examined: whether the Platonic condemnation of sea-power was repeated by the Romans in order to justify the destruction of Carthage. So much is certain, that the Roman offer that the Carthaginians should settle at least eighty stades from the sea corresponds exactly to the suggestion of the *Laws* for the ideal city. Appian goes a step farther. He attributes to the Roman consul L. Marcius Censorinus a long speech which develops the Platonic argument against sea-power (*Pun.* 86-9). If the speech could be proved to derive ultimately from Polybius, it might correspond to the real words of a Roman consul. But the derivation has never been demonstrated (though never disproved), and all we can say is that Appian provides evidence that Platonic arguments were utilized by Roman annalists to justify Roman cruelty.³ In other words, the passage of Appian is evidence for the survival of the

¹ Cf. Aesch. *Prom.* 467; Eurip. *Suppl.* 209; Arat. *Phaen.* 110; Strab. xi. 4. 3; Philo, *Quod omnis probus*, 12, 78; Lucret. v. 1006; Virg. *Georg.* i. 137; ii. 503; Tib. i. 3. 35; Ovid, *Met.* i. 94; *Amor.* iii. 8. 43; Manil. *Astr.* i. 77; Sen. *Med.* 301; *Phaetra*, 530. These and other texts are quoted by A. O. Lovejoy and G. Boas, *Primitivism and Related Ideas in Antiquity*, Baltimore, 1935, *passim*. Negatively, it is interesting that sea-power is not discussed in Plat. *Protog.* 320 c ff.; Polybius, vi. 4-6; Diodor. i. 8, and Hippodamus' *Περί Πολιτείας* (Stobaeus, 43, 94 = iv. 1, 95, p. 33 H.), on which especially cf. W. Theiler, *Gnomon*, 1926, 151.

² See for instance *Laws*, iii. 679d with v. 742 d. ³ Cf. Diod. xxxii. 6. 3; Livy, *Per.* 49; Zon. ix. 26; Oros. iv. 22. 3, and also Polyb. iii. 5. 5. On the speech of the Roman consul see S. Gsell, *Hist. anc. de l'Afrique du Nord*, iii. 348, n. 4 (cf. U. Kahrstedt, *Gesch. d. Karth.*, iii. 644, n. 1). The relation with Plato was noted by O. Meltzer, *Neue Jahrb. f. Philol.* cxliii, 1891, 685. F. W. Walbank called my attention to the passage of Appian.

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Platonic tradition in the matter of sea-power versus the Aristotelian compromise.

VI. The more profound reasons for the hostility of much Greek political thought to sea-power need not be emphasized: they are to be found in its anti-banausic and anti-democratic bias and largely show the influence of the epic conception of an individual virtue which only land-fighting can show. The Athenian Empire became the best argument for this hostility. In the fifth century 'the question of imperialism was largely one of food' (Glotz). Sea-power gave food and made full democracy possible.¹ Thucydides' effort

to oppose to this hostility a qualified belief in the constructive sides of Athenian imperialism was doomed to failure by the tyrant character which he attributed to Athens. I suppose that the anti-naval bias is attenuated in Aristotle both for many other obvious reasons and by his better historical knowledge. He knew that sea-power was compatible with more than one political form. Indeed, the association of sea-power with democracy had been an exceptional feature of Athens. Until the formation of modern national States sea-power was more frequently associated with oligarchies, Republican Rome included. But neither Aristotle nor any other Greek philosopher totally overcame the distrust of the acquisitive instinct and of the plebeian habits which were believed to be peculiar to sailors and maritime cities.

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¹ Cf. especially B. Büchschütz, *Besitz und Erwerb im griech. Alterthum*, Halle, 1869, 512 ff.; G. Glotz, *Ancient Greece at Work*, Engl. transl., London, 1926, 293 ff.; A. E. Zimmern, *The Greek Commonwealth*, 5th ed., Oxford, 1931; J. Hasebroek, *Trade and Politics in Ancient Greece*, Engl. transl., London, 1933, 130 ff. Furthermore, G. Glotz, 'La marine et la cité de l'épopée à l'histoire' in *Études sociales et juridiques sur l'antiquité grecque*, Paris, 1906, 229-53.

THE STORY OF ATLANTIS: ITS PURPOSE AND ITS MORAL

THE story of the lost island of Atlantis, 'larger than Libya and Asia', with the account given by Critias of how that story had come down to him from Solon, makes a delightful opening to the *Timaeus*, and shows that Plato, at the age of 70 or thereabouts, was still a master of lively narrative and dialogue. But why is the story here at all? Why is it, taken together with its development in the unfinished *Critias*, in such a position that the main body of the *Timaeus* becomes a mere episode in a prehistoric romance?

As Plato did not finish the *Critias* and did not even begin the third dialogue of his projected trilogy, the *Hermocrates*, we cannot answer this question with certainty.¹ But we can perhaps make a reasonable guess.

In the first place, Plato wants to put his reader in the right atmosphere, the

atmosphere of myth, of symbolism and imaginative truth. 'Once upon a time' is the formula of the main myth, the cosmological; and 'once upon a time' not indeed unimaginably remote, but sufficiently distant—9,000 years ago—is the formula of the secondary myth, the myth of the Ideal State projected into temporal existence. No one who is alive to this parallelism will doubt that Xenocrates was right, as against Aristotle, in holding that in representing the making of the ordered universe, the κόσμος, as an event in time Plato was writing 'for the sake of exposition' (διδασκαλίας χάριν): in other words, that his cosmogony is disguised cosmology. Further, I would suggest that in one particular passage Plato has been at pains to ensure that we shall not miss the parallelism of the two myths. At 24c Athena, the tutelary goddess of Athens and Egyptian Sais alike, is spoken of as having 'bestowed on you (Athenians) first all this ordering and system' (ταύτην σύμπασαν τὴν διακόμην)

¹ For some speculations on the projected content of the *Hermocrates*, and on the plan of the whole trilogy, see F. M. Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology*, pp. 6-8.

καὶ σύνταξιν ἢ θεὸς προτέρους ὑμᾶς διακοσμήσασα). Now this word διακοσμεῖν (and its noun) may be called the *vox propria* of cosmology, particularly of the teleological type: it was used by Anaxagoras of his νοῦς, and will be used by Timaeus at 53 A 7. Its occurrence here would, I think, at once make a contemporary reader think of Anaxagoras. But let us not attach too much importance to a word. The real point is that Plato surely means us to see a parallelism of ideas: the city of Athens standing as microcosm over against the universe as macrocosm. Athena gives it its ideal order, the polity which is its κόσμος, just as the Supreme God, the Demiurge, gives the Universe its order. Moreover, if we read on, we notice that Athena chooses for her city a site which will be 'likely to bear men most like herself' (τὸν προσφερεστάτους αὐτῇ μέλλοντα οἰσεῖν τόπον ἄνδρας): and so the Demiurge later on desires all things to be ὅτι μάλιστα παραπλήσια ἐαυτῷ (29 E).

This seems fairly clear evidence of intentional preparation of the reader's mind, and of linking the two myths together. And the significance of Athena's διακοσμήσεις, the significance indeed of the whole story of the prowess of prehistoric Athens (identified with the State of the *Republic*, 26 D), is heightened for those who remember the παράδειγμα ἐν οὐρανῷ at the end of *Rep.* ix. Glaucon there says that their city 'founded in the realm of discourse' exists nowhere on earth: and Socrates replies, 'No, but perhaps there is a pattern set up in the heavens for anyone who likes to see it, and seeing it to found such a city in himself'. That is to say, the visible order (κόσμος) of the universe, especially as revealed in the movements of the stars and planets, is a pattern which on the one hand reproduces, albeit imperfectly, an ideal spiritual order (the παράδειγμα of the Demiurge, κατὰ ταῦτά ἔχον αἰεὶ, 28 A), and on the other hand is itself reproduced in the well-ordered πόλις; while the πόλις again is (as the *Republic* has shown) the individual 'writ large'. Hence the individual soul, the πόλις, and

the visible universe are all alike manifestations of one and the same spiritual order.¹

All this, I suggest, is in Plato's mind, and meant to be in his readers' minds, when he makes Critias here speak of Athena ordering Athens, and of the ancient Athenians as like herself: not of course that she is the spiritual order, but because she, no less than the Demiurge, looks to that order in all her works, since she, like him, is divine and good.

If this be the right explanation of Plato's main purpose in opening the *Timaeus* as he does, it still does not account for everything in these opening pages. What chiefly remains to be accounted for is the insistence on the spiritual affinity and the similar political and social institutions of Athens and Sais. No doubt it was natural enough for Plato to take us to Egypt for the source of his legend—the record, lost by Athens herself, had to be preserved somewhere—but the affinity in question is an unessential addition to Plato's main story, and unnecessary to his purpose as I have interpreted it. The explanation is, I think, simply that he wants to seize an opportunity for acknowledging the debt of his *Republic* to the Egyptian caste-system, of which of course we know independently. Perhaps he felt that he ought to have made some such acknowledgement in the *Republic* itself.

Has the Atlantis story a moral? Professor Taylor thinks it has: he writes:² 'The moral of the story is transparently simple. It is that a small and materially poor community animated by true patriotism and high moral ideals can

¹ Cf. P. Friedländer, *Die plat. Schriften*, p. 602. 'Vielmehr wächst aus der gemeinsamen Wurzel der Staatsutopie der Doppelmythos: einerseits das Weltgebäude als "grössere Politeia" (Proklos), als die im Raum sich entfaltende "Idee des Guten", als höchster Erziehungsgegenstand, der zu jener Idee emporfährt, als Bild, das schon im Schlussmythos des Staates vom Schicksal der Seele weiten Raum beansprucht—andererseits Urathen als Hineingestaltung ins Zeitliche und Verbildlichung dessen, was in der Form des reinen Seins der Staat gebracht hatte.'

² *Commentary on P.'s Timaeus*, p. 50. Similarly in his translation, p. 104.

be more than a match for a populous and wealthy empire with immense material resources but wanting in virtue.'

If I take leave to doubt this moral, I imply no lack of respect and admiration for Professor Taylor's immensely valuable commentary. Perhaps we may wonder how such a moral would appeal to-day to Finns, Norwegians, Dutchmen—and Greeks. The deficiency of the Atlantids in virtue cannot be said to be emphasized in the *Timaeus*, at all events: the only indication of it there is in the words ὕβρει πορευομένην ἐπὶ πᾶσαν Εὐρώπην καὶ Ἀσίαν at 24 E; they were a very aggressive power, but nothing is said in this dialogue of other moral failings. It is true that in the *Critias*, which is largely occupied by a description of the grandiose building and engineering works of the Atlantids, we are told in the last pages that, after many generations of walking in the paths of righteousness, they finally lapsed and became 'infected with wicked covetousness and power' (121 B), so that Zeus decided to punish them. Hence no doubt the conventional notion of divine punishment for ὕβρις does enter into the story. But we must not suppose that Plato wants to make us believe that 'a small and materially poor community' can conquer a great and rich one simply by being morally

virtuous. His primitive Athens was not a minor power: it was conspicuous all over the world for valour and strength, outstanding in courage and military arts, and the leader of a Greek federation against the enemy until its allies fell away (25 B-C). No doubt the manpower of the Atlantids was vastly greater than that of Athens; but it is hardly suggested that this was a miraculous victory, due to the divine support of moral worth.

If the story has a moral, I think it is that defensive war—resistance against aggression—is the supreme glory of a people, particularly if it is a war in defence of other peoples as well, to rescue them from foreign domination, whether actual or threatened: κρατήσασα μὲν τῶν ἐπιόντων τρόπαιον ἔστησεν, τοὺς δὲ μήπω δεδουλωμένους διεκώλυσεν δουλωθῆναι, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους . . . ἀφθόνως ἅπαντας ἡλευθέρωσεν (25 C).

It is heartening for us to-day to think that Plato should have believed that in telling of such a war he could best picture the men of his ideal Republic 'achieving results befitting their nurture and education' (19 C). And who can read the words αὐτὴ μονωθείσα ἐξ ἀνάγκης τῶν ἄλλων ἀποστάντων ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐσχάτους ἀφικομένη κινδύνους (25 C) without thinking of Britain in 1940-1?

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AESCHYLUS, AGAMEMNON 1426-30 AND SEPTEM 967

μεγαλόμητις εἰ,
παράφρονα δ' ἔλακες ὥσπερ οὖν
φονολιβεῖ τυπᾷ φρήν ἐπιμαίνεται,
λίβος ἐπ' ὀμμάτων αἵματος ἂν πρόποι
ἀτίστον ἐπὶ χρῆ στερομέναν φίλων
τύμμα τύμματι τεῖσαι.

1426¹

1426²

THAT is what I printed in 1936. παράφρονα Musgrave for περίφρονα, τυπᾷ myself for τύχα, λίβος Casaubon for λίπος, ἂν πρόποι G. A. Davies for εὖ πρόπει. sé post ἐπὶ deleuit Platt.

In a recently published lecture¹ Professor Fraenkel, discussing 1428 as normally read (ἐμπρέπει Auratus), rightly denounces as grotesque the sense 'a drip of blood shows upon thy eye (or fore-

head)', but assures us that Verrall (followed by Professor G. Thomson) 'fully understood the true meaning of the passage'; it refers 'to the bloodshot eye which they see, or suppose themselves to see, in the furious face of the murderer'.

Now what can be the use of proclaiming such an interpretation? Even if that were what this Greek meant or must imply (no evidence whatever is given by any of the three scholars who think so,¹ and prima facie the sense is

¹ Fraenkel rejects the current interpretation on the ground that we have no reason for supposing that the blood with which the Queen is admittedly

¹ See review on p. 21.

simply not there), it would then become necessary to emend the line, for the simple reason that 'your eyes are bloodshot' (they are 'as bloodshot as your heart is blood-maddened'!) makes no sense whatever in this context (if, indeed, in any); it is as irrelevant as it is trivial (and as trivial as it is absurd). 'I slew him justly, and I defy your protests.' 'You are *mad and* (or *since?*) *your eyes are bloodshot, and* there is retribution in store for you.' What sort of discourse is that?

The problem is not simply to attach some kind of meaning to 1428. It is, as ever, to make 1428 contribute duly to the coherence of 1426-30. And such coherence, such purport, is itself in turn conditioned by the speech 1412-25, to which speech this passage must present a rational reply. Further, that reply must also be such that it leads with equal cogeny to the rejoinder 1431-7.

The first step to salvation, though I seem to be the only editor who took it, is Musgrave's *παράφρονα*.¹ 'You would make me an outcast, would you, a public enemy? Do—if you have the power! If not—woe betide you.' 'Yes, you are a shrewd woman, we know; *but* when you threaten thus you are *not* wise—you miscalculate.' That is, as the speaker proceeds to explain, you do not reflect upon the inevitable retribution. 'I do not indeed, while I have my Aegisthus with me.'

Headlam apprehended that 1427-8 must constitute the statement which is amplified in 1429-30. But he failed, as G. A. Davies saw, to implement the Greek with the indispensable indication of futurity. Yet Davies's *ἂν πρόπει* does not really make good this shortcoming; the menace, if it is as yet there at all, is far too vaguely and oddly thus expressed. Besides—and now we reach

(1389-92) bespattered is on her *brow* at all. True; but why then substitute a suggestion for which there is even less evidence? In these matters one must at least play fair.

¹ Since 1426 does not even make sense in itself, the dodge is to keep *δ'* but translate *τ'*; see e.g. Verrall, Weir Smyth, G. Thomson. Further, 'λακεῖν is an invidious word', Headlam, p. 210; true; how then can *περίφρονα* be thus used with it?

the core of the difficulty—the sentence remains essentially the same jargon as ever. Its grossest defects are two. First, the emphatic contrast between *φρόν* and *δμμάτων* finds no conceivable justification; 'blow for blow' (1430), 'blood for blood' are natural and rational expressions; 'bloody eye for bloody heart' is neither Aeschylean nor anything else as a statement of the *lex talionis*. Secondly, even in 1427 alone 'heart maddened by murder-dealing blow' is only one degree less preposterous than '... by ... *chance* (hap, event)'. Why specify the heart as the seat of madness? Parallels are to seek; see below. And actually the 'madness' (if it *were* that) which is to be *punished* is the 'madness' (if it *were that*) which planned the blow (or 'hap'), not the madness (if any) which followed its execution. Stuff like this—how can anyone doubt it?—is sheer nonsense, unworthy the time of learned or cultured men to expound; if it is not to be corrected it should be printed between obeli. But it can be corrected, and without difficulty.

From 1389-92 the natural—the obvious—inference is that what was blood-bespattered was the murderess's raiment. Now at 541 I turned nonsense into sense by altering *δμμασιν* to *εἵμασιν*. A similar change here will give us the clue to the entire puzzle by indicating that we have to transpose 1427-8:

ὥσπερ οὖν
λίβος ἐφ' εἰμάτων αἵματος ἐμπρέπει,
φονολιβὴ τυπὰν χροῖ σ' ἐτι γ' αἰνέσαι
ἀτίετον ἐτι χροῖ στερομένην φίλων
τύμμα τύμματι τέισαι.

'So surely as the splash of blood is now conspicuous upon thy raiment, so surely must thou one day yet submit to the blow that shall spill thy blood.' Could anything be more coherent and fluent¹ and Aeschylean than that? I hope I do not need to draw attention to the exactness of the tally *χροῖ σ' ἐτι ... ἐτι χροῖ*,² nor to the balancing of *αἰνέσαι*

¹ Compare review, p. 21, final paragraph, on the new fragments.

² Platt, *J. Phil.* xxxv. 92, gave the two sound reasons why we should read *ἀτίετον* rather than *ἀντίτον*. That 'σέ is unnecessary' (with the

with *τεῖσαι*, nor to the general interrelation and studied order of the words in 1427-29-30. But on the other side of the reconstruction there is a tally scarcely less significant; their *ἔτι γε* is the reply to her *ὀφὲ γούν*. What word it was precisely that followed *φονολυβῆ* is a very minor problem; my *τυπᾶν* now corresponds not (as before) to *τύμμα* but to *τύμματι*;¹ but whoever will may fall back upon the feeble *τύχαν* without prejudice to my reconstruction. The reference is not, as Headlam conjectured, to a state-imposed penalty; we had that in 1409-11; *narratio pergit*; besides, 1424-5 has intervened; the reference is to Orestes (cf. 1667, based on 1280-1).²

feminine participle) is also true; yet its omission was in the circumstances somewhat inelegant. This objection now disappears.

¹ Assuming that the construction is as analysed in L.S.J. s.v. *τύμα* I. 4.

² I feel bound to add that in this respect there is also a perfect correspondence between this text of 1426-30 and my own (but no one else's) of 1434. It is also worth observing that *ὥσπερ οὖν* appears in Aeschylus only thrice, and that our example now corresponds closely with *Cho.* 96 and still more closely with *Cho.* 888; on Fraenkel's view it is far

Since editors do not parallel *φρήν ἐπιμαίνεται*, I will, to show what the parallel is worth, and for another reason. *Sept.* 967 *μαίνεται γόοισι φρήν* is demonstrably unmetrical, and Lachmann's <ῆ>, poor in itself, leaves Antigone with a word which she would never have used of her natural and just grief for her slain brother. I read *Δαίνεται γόοισι φρήν*, which I think is virtually confirmed by another Aeschylean antiphonal trochaic dimeter in a kommos, *διαίνομαι γοεδνός ὦν Pers.* '1047' (1039 is its true place). The addition of *φρήν* here to this phrase provides an instructive contrast with *Agam.* 1427 codd., because (i) it is matched by the *καρδία στένει* of the metrically equivalent response, and (ii) these two paradoxes are full of point, the object being to show that, as Tucker says, 'the grief is no mere outward demonstration'.

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otherwise, and indeed one may question whether his *οὖν* has force at all, since his 1427 refers to nothing manifest or axiomatic.

TWO NOTES ON EURIPIDES, *MEDEA*

- (1) 1317 τί τάσδε κινεῖς ἀναμοχλεύεις
πύλας;

WHAT is the meaning of *ἀναμοχλεύεις*? According to Liddell and Scott the verb means 'to raise by a lever' (for example in Lucian, *Cont.* 4), but in this passage 'to force open'. The editions, however, with the exception, perhaps, of Headlam's somewhat ambiguous interpretation as *ἀνοιγνύναι*, take it in the sense of 'to unbar'. So Paley: '*ἀναμοχλεύεις* — "try to unbar", i.e. to have it unbarred by those within. It is a great mistake to translate "force it with levers" (from without).' This interpretation is supported by Verrall, who adds that 'the preposition in *ἀναμοχλεύειν* has a negative force as in *ἀνακαλύπτειν*'. Finally, Page explains '... it can hardly be a coincidence that *ἀναμοχλεύειν* here not only is a *καὶνὸν ἔπος* (it does not occur again till Lucian),

but also bears an unexpected meaning. It should mean *lever up*, *prise up by means of leverage*, cf. *μοχλεύω* in H. 999, *Kukl.* 240; but here as 1314-15 clearly show, it means simply "undo the *μοχλοί*", *unbar*.' The translators seem inclined to take the word differently: '... why batter ye With brazen bars?' (Gilbert Murray), 'Pourquoi ébranler et faire sauter ces portes?' (Mérider), 'Perchè sommuovi e scardini quest'uscio?' (Faggella).

Certainly, if the reference were to unbarring the door, as the editors mostly think, we should expect not *ἀναμοχλεύειν* but some compound of *μοχλοῦν*; the verbs *μοχλεύειν* and *μοχλοῦν* seem not to have been confused before John Chrysostom. Could the poet, even with the support of lines 1314-15, have constructed a new compound and at the same time have expected his audience to attribute to the

verbal part of it a meaning belonging to another verb? Not only the structure of the verb but also the dramatic situation calls for the sense of 'force open'. Medea has murdered her children in the house behind barred doors; in 1314-15 Jason, standing outside, calls to the πρόσπολοι, who, as Page points out, must be within the house, to unbar, while presumably in his impatience he brings force to bear on the door from outside. The passage of the *Heracles Furens* to which Page refers describes a very similar situation:

δεύτερον δὲ παῖδ' ἐλὼν
χωρεῖ τρίτον θύμ' ὡς ἐπισφάζων θυοῖν.
ἀλλὰ φθάνει νυν ἡ τάλαιν' εἰσω δόμων
μήτηρ ὑπεκλαβοῦσα, καὶ κλῆει πύλας.
ὁ δ' ὡς ἐπ' αὐτοῖς δὴ Κυκλωπίσιον ὦν
σκάπτει, μοχλεῖται θύρετρα. . . . (994-9)

Jason, however, is no Heracles, and his efforts are in vain.

So understood, the context affords no obstacle to taking the word ἀναμοχλεύεις in the sense given by Liddell and Scott and required by its component parts. The verbal part of the compound is used, we may suppose, without reference to an actual crowbar (unless Jason, like the White Knight, came equipped for all possibilities). The prepositional part need not merely mean 'up' as Page says; it can have the sense of 'back' seen in ἀνακρούειν, and, with special application to the folding back of the leaves of a door, in ἀνακλίνειν, ἀνοιγνύναι.

What of the subsequent history of the verse, if this be the correct explanation of ἀναμοχλεύεις? It is reasonable to think that the unusual word in so striking a dramatic context as Medea's first utterance after the murder of the children impressed the line on the memories of the audience. It was, therefore, among many others, suitable material for Aristophanes' satire through parody; *Clouds*, 1397, ὦ καινῶν ἐπὶ κινήτῃ καὶ μοχλευτῇ, protests against Euripides' manner of disturbing linguistic usage by his neologisms, and the collocation κινήτῃ καὶ μοχλευτῇ serves to call to mind one such innovation. Further, the line seems to have become proverbial, and, like many quotations

applied beyond their contexts, to have suffered some distortion of sense (compare 'hinc illae lacrimae', 'a touch of nature . . .'). In the passage of Heliodorus (i. 8) where Cnemion, asked by Theagenes and Chariclea for an account of his adventures, exclaims 'τί ταῦτα κινεῖς κἀναμοχλεύεις; τοῦτο δὲ τὸ τῶν τραγῳδῶν', the expression seems no more than an affected expansion of the idea contained in κινεῖν of disturbing what is at rest, what is fixed or done with. In this sense the line could be adapted *ad libitum*, and thus the misquotation of it in the *Christus Patiens* is not difficult to understand.

(2) 1362 λύει δ' ἄλγος, ἣν σὺ μὴ ᾔγγελῃς.

The Scholiast here takes ἄλγος as the subject of λύει, which he explains as equivalent in meaning to λυσιτελεῖ, and this interpretation has been followed by Paley and Verrall among others. Porson, however, without rejecting the Scholiast's view ('neque ego repugno'), added the alternative suggestion 'potest tamen significare, minuit, levat meum dolorem, si tu non irrides', which Elmsley adopted, though it is hard to see how λύειν can mean 'to lessen'. Page, too, prefers to take ἄλγος as the object and the ἣν clause as the subject of λύει, which he understands in the sense of 'does away with', 'removes', or possibly in 'the extended sense "atone for"'.

As far as may be judged from the lexica, λύει in the sense of λυσιτελεῖ, though sufficiently attested, is not common; the fact, therefore, that it occurs with this meaning in two other passages of the *Medea* (566, 1112) may be taken as increasing the probability that it is so to be understood here, since it is a well-known phenomenon that a word or expression may be in a writer's mind and assert itself repeatedly in the composition of a particular work. But the choice of alternative in this case depends on dramatic rather than linguistic or psychological considerations. Jason is amazed that Medea should have taken a path of vengeance so painful to herself as well as to him. Indeed, when contemplating her plan

to murder the children, Medea had herself in a moment of revulsion asked why she should cause Jason pain at the cost of causing twice as much pain to herself (1046-7). Revenge is to Medea something required of her by the situation in which she is; it is not something which will bring an end of her misery. She says (798-9)

ἴτω· τί μοι ζῆν κέρδος; οὔτε μοι πατρίς
οὔτ' οἶκος ἔστιν οὔτ' ἀποστροφὴ κακῶν.

on which Page comments 'ἀποστροφὴ κακῶν means "refuge from calamity": but Medea is right in thinking she has none. Aegeus' palace is an ἀποστροφὴ τιμωρίας, a refuge from punishment or even death, but not of course from her unhappiness. . . . The κακά are the dreadful misfortune which her children's death means to Medea: she does not escape from it by going to live at Athens.' Again, she says (1244-9):

ἀγ', ὦ τάλανα χεῖρ ἐμή, λαβὲ ξίφος,
λάβ', ἔρπε πρὸς βαλβίδα λυπηρὰν βίου,
καὶ μὴ κακισθῆς μηδ' ἀναμνησθῆς τέκνων,

ὡς φιλτατ', ὡς ἔτικτες· ἀλλὰ τήνδε γε
λαθοῦ βραχέϊαν ἡμέραν παίδων σῖθεν,
κάπειτα θρήνηι.

Here the βαλβίδα λυπηρὰν βίου is not the end but the starting-point of unhappiness.

If 1362 is to mean 'It removes my grief if you do not mock me', we must then suppose a sudden change in Medea's mood and outlook; she must be in a state of exultation at the success of her plan and the humiliation of Jason, or else perhaps she must wish to seem to him unmoved by the death of her children. But there is nothing in her last appearance to suggest that that is so. Medea's character has greater unity, and this utterance, and with it the close of the play as a whole, is more poignant if the Scholiast's interpretation be followed.

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ARISTOPHANEA

Nu. 729-30 οἶμοι τίς ἂν δῆτ' ἐπιβάλαι
ἐξ ἀρναικίδων γνώμην ἀποστερητρίδα;

EVEN taking τίς with ἐξ ἀρν.¹ ('would that someone from among the fleeces would . . .') it is impossible to make much sense of this. ἐπιβάλλειν σισύρας <τινί> would indeed be a natural expression; ἐπιβάλλειν γνώμην is not. (Starkie's citation of S. Aj. 51 δυσφόρους ἐπ' ὄμμασι | γνώμας βαλοῦσα is no real parallel). Rogers and Van Leeuwen are driven to suppose that Socrates had piled rugs upon Strepsiades and that the latter means (to quote Rogers) 'O that someone would pile upon me a privative device out of these sheepskins'. But (1) we have no reason to suppose that Socrates had piled rugs upon Strepsiades; (2) even if he had, the implied zeugma ('piled rugs . . . pile a device') is next to impossible. What Strepsiades wants of the bed-bugs is *prompting*. The technical verb for to *prompt* is ὑποβάλλειν

(see L and S⁹ ὑποβάλλω III). Might we not, then, read here ὑποβάλαι? 'Would that some <bug> from among the fleeces would suggest <to me> a privative device.'

Nu. 1006-7 στεφανωσάμενος καλάμῳ λευκῷ . . .
μίλακος ὄζων καὶ ἀπραγμοσύνης καὶ
λεύκης φυλλοβολούσης.

No one would, I think, have suspected λευκῷ (the reading of M, A, and U) but for the fact that both the Ravennas and the Venetus omit the word, while in the Ravennas the rest of the line is written as a *marginale*. Van Leeuwen (followed by Starkie) reads λεπτῷ and notes: nihil est arundo candida, vitium autem peperit sequentis versus vox λεύκη. Cf. fr. 51 κερκώπην θηρευσάμενῃ καλάμῳ λεπτῷ.

We may first ask why a 'white reed' is 'nonsense'. If mulberries can by the Greeks be called white (Aesch. fr. 116) and also myrtles (Ar. Av. 1100; Pi. I. 4. 69), why not reeds? But if the disease is imaginary the cure is fatal. As the very words cited by Van Leeuwen show, καλάμῳ in fr. 51 means 'an arrow',

¹ Cf. l. 37 δάκνει με δῆμαρχός τις ἐκ τῶν στρωμάτων.

not 'a reed'; and whereas 'light' is a suitable epithet for an arrow it is a highly unsuitable one for a reed. Van Leeuwen may have been (mis)led to λεπτῷ by the scholiast who glosses καλάμῳ λευκῷ by λιτὸς γὰρ καὶ ἀπερίεργος ὁ τοιοῦτος στέφανος. As to the collocation of λευκῷ . . . λεύκης (note the different accents) it is no more objectionable than would be that of 'blue scabious' and 'bluebell' in English.

Ra. 169 Δι. εὐν δὲ μὴ εὐρω; Σα. τότε μ' ἄγειν.

The sense must be: Di. 'Suppose I cannot find a corpse willing to carry the burden?' Xan. 'Then I will do so.' We must in any case read τότε ἐμέ (Krüger), as indeed Van Leeuwen and Coulon do. But what of ἄγειν? Rogers light-heartedly translates 'Then I'll take them'. This is to take ἄγειν as though it were φέρειν, and furthermore to deprive the infinitive of any con-

struction. Tucker is more careful. He notes: 'τότε μ' ἄγειν, "then take me" (MSS.) and τότε ἐμ' ἄγειν (Bergk) are equally possible', adding (most unfortunately) 'but there is no superiority in the latter'. He continues: 'ἄγειν: either as imperat. (cf. εἶναι 133), or we may supply κελεύω from ἱκετεύω (167) despite the intervening μίσθωσαι.' The second alternative strikes me as flatly impossible, and the first is unsatisfactory, for we want a verb (expressed or understood) to denote Xanthias', not Dionysus', consequent action. This may be got by reading τότε ἐμέ δεῖ 'then I shall have to'. ἄγειν may have been a marginal gloss (admittedly a bad one) which got into the text and ousted δεῖ. For τότε = 'in that case' cf. Pl. R. 334 c ἀλλ' ὅμως δίκαιον τότε τοῖτοις τοὺς . . . ἀγαθοὺς βλάπτειν.

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BOYTONIA IN GEOPONICA XV. 2

THIS chapter of the *Geoponica*, culled professedly from Florentinus, deals with bees, and, together with other useful information, tells us how to produce them from the body of a dead ox. King Juba, it seems, recommended the use of a wooden chest; the better method, however, is to construct a building 15 feet square and the same in height with a shutter in each wall and a single door. Introduce into this building a fat ox aged two and a half years, and a number of young men, who must then beat it to death with clubs, taking care not to break the skin. Plug the natural openings in the body, spread thyme on the floor, lay the ox on the thyme, seal the door and shutters hermetically with clay, and go away. In the second week following open the door and shutters to let in light and air, ἐπὶ δὲ δόξωσιν ἐμφυλῶσθαι αἱ ὕλαι πνεῦμα αὐτάρκες ἐπισπασάμεναι, seal the building as before; then, if you return in ten days' time, you will find the horns, bones, and hair of your ox, and your building full of clusters of bees.

In the clause which I have quoted there are no material variants in the

manuscripts, and it stands so in the three printed editions of the *Geoponica* which I have consulted.¹ In the version attached to the texts of Needham (Cambridge, 1704) and Niclas (Leipzig, 1781) it is translated *postquam autem materiae videbuntur animari*, and I presume that Beckh, the Teubner editor, concurs in this interpretation. The word ὕλη, however, is not used in this sense elsewhere in the *Geoponica*, it would naturally be in the singular, and it accords ill with πνεῦμα ἐπισπασάμεναι. I hope, therefore, that I need expend no more words in recommending the next editor to print αἱ εὐλαί, the maggots or larvae, who will be stimulated to unwonted activity in their attempts to escape from the light, and will seem to the hopeful apiarist to have come to life. That bees generated by bugony were conceived to pass through a larval stage is already plain from Virgil (*G.* 4. 310), whose account, though less detailed, agrees in essentials with that of the *Geoponica*; and in the latter the

¹ There is only one other, the *editio princeps* of 1539. This I have not seen, but no doubt it agrees.

larvae are described at some length. And if the belief owes something to the occasional discovery of swarms or nests of bees in the skeleton or desiccated carcass of an animal (as at Judges 14. 8), and more to the resemblance between bees and drone-flies, which frequent putrescent matter, it was probably fostered by the resemblance between blow-fly maggots and bee-larvae.¹

The recipe for bugony here preferred to that of the Mauretanian monarch is ascribed in the text to Δημόκριτος καὶ Βάρων ἐν Ῥωμαίᾳ γλώσσῃ. No such matter is extant in Varro, whose brief references to the subject will be found at R.R. 2. 5. 5, 3. 16. 4; and Columella (9. 14. 6) remarks: *progenerari posse apes iuuenco perempto Democritus et Mago nec minus Vergilius prodiderunt. Mago quidem uentribus etiam bubulis idem fieri affirmat, quam rationem diligentius prosequi superuacuum puto*. Presumably, therefore, Βάρων is a mistake for Μάγων, and the person meant is the eminent Carthaginian agriculturalist whom Columella calls *rusticationis parentem*, and frequently cites. The words ἐν Ῥωμαίᾳ γλώσσῃ need cause no surprise,² for Mago's works had enjoyed the distinction of being translated into Latin by order of the Senate (Col. 1. 1. 13; Plin. N.H. 18. 22). There was

also a Greek translation which apparently omitted a good deal of the original (Varr. R.R. 1. 1. 10), and if the author is not merely telling us that he did not use the Phoenician text he may be indicating that the passage was not to be found in the Greek. Unlike Varro, Mago is not elsewhere mentioned in the *Geoponica*, and the familiar name might easily replace the unfamiliar there, though it is, of course, possible that the corruption occurred in some earlier intermediary of this lore.

Since this recipe comes apparently from Africa and King Juba supplied another from the same continent, it may be worth remark that Virgil (G. 4. 287) asserts it to be in general use in Egypt¹ and that he assigns some part in his story to Cyrene, the mother of Aristaeus, though he treats Aristaeus himself as an Arcadian. Apart from the highly suspect 'Democritus', the earliest Greeks to betray knowledge of the belief are apparently Philetas, who was tutor to Ptolemy Philadelphus, and Callimachus, who was a native of Africa (Phil. fr. 22, Call. fr. 230). That continent had a reputation for novelties, and it looks much as though bugony was one of them.

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¹ On the origins of the belief see J. Phil. xxxiv. 97, W. M. Wheeler, *Social Life among the Insects*, 93, 315. For reference to the latter work I am indebted to Dr. G. Salt.

² Attached to Varro they would be odd, for he

would more naturally either be called δ Ῥωμαϊκός as at 1. 1. 2 (cf. 1. 14. 10) or else, as commonly, be left without qualification.

¹ An Egyptian recipe in which the ox is buried is mentioned in Antig. Car. 19 (23).

'CINNAE QVATER CONSVLIS'

RECENT attempts to shed light on the obscurities of Julius Caesar's early history have contrived to deepen the darkness which envelops one crucial piece of evidence. We are assured by J. Carcopino that Caesar married Cornelia 'sous le quatrièrme consulat de Cinna' (*Mélanges Bidez*—Brussels, 1934—52). G. De Sanctis applauds: 'Cesare . . . fu nominato *flamen Dialis*, repudiò Cossutia e sposò Cornelia figlia di Cinna, console per la quarta volta. Con ciò i tre ultimi fatti verrebbero datati nei primi mesi dell' 84, cioè all' inizio del

quarto consolato di Cinna . . . tra il primo gennaio e la morte di Cinna' (*Riv. fil.* N.S. xii, 1934, 550). And L. R. Taylor betrays no qualm: 'Suetonius dates the union with Cornelia in Cinna's fourth consulship, the year 84' (*Class. Phil.* xxxvi, 1941, 114). Statements like these cannot be treated with indifference; for they affect the determination of the year not merely of Caesar's first marriage but also of his birth, and through that they bear on questions of some importance about the minimum ages at which the various magistracies

could be held during the last century of the Roman Republic.

The evidence offered for these assertions is in every case the same—'flamen Dialis destinatus dimissa Cossutia, quae familia equestri sed admodum diues praetextato desponsata fuerat, Corneliam Cinnae quater consulis filiam duxit uxorem' (Suet. *Diu. Iul.* 1, 1). To point out that this passage provides no grounds whatever for such allegations might pardonably have been thought unnecessary had the allegations not actually been made; for the relevant facts were set out over thirty years ago by A. E. Housman—in explaining that the grammatical construction of Martial 10, 48, 20, as emended by N. Heinsius, is 'quae, Frontino consule, bis trima fuit' (*J.P.* xxx, 1907, 251 f.). According to every probability, the meaning of the last seven words in the quotation from Suetonius is 'married Cornelia, daughter of the Cinna who was four times consul'—which no more suggests that Cinna had entered his fourth consulship at the time of the wedding than one would imply that C. Marius was *consul septimum* in 102 or 101, and not in 86 B.C., by saying 'the chief credit for the deliverance of Italy from the German menace in 102 and 101 B.C. belongs to the famous Marius, seven times consul'. The words 'quater consulis' do not date the occurrence: they identify Cinna (and possibly emphasize his distinction).

The use of the numerical adverbs of frequency (*bis*, *ter*, and so forth) to indicate the number of a particular tenure of an office, power, or the like by an individual who held the position or received the grant in question more than once is not established before the time of the *Historia Augusta*. Earlier usage employs these adverbs in such contexts only to convey the total number of times an office has been held, or an honour conferred. When Cicero calls the captor of Syracuse 'M. Marcellus ille quinquies consul' (*de diu.* 2, 77), what he means is 'the well-known M. Marcellus who was five times consul'. To express the number of

some particular tenure of an office held repeatedly by a single individual, Latin before the fourth century added to the title of the officer one of the ordinal adverbs (*iterum*, *tertium*—or *tertio*—and the rest). When Cicero asks 'cur . . . Marius tam feliciter septimum consul domi suae senex est mortuus?' (*de nat. deor.* 3, 81), if 'septimum' is to be read his question is why Marius, despite the evil he had done, died peacefully at home in old age during his seventh consulship.

'A man', says Housman (l.c. 252), 'is *tertium consul* while he holds his third consulship: he is *ter consul* from the day when he assumes his third consulship to the day when he assumes his fourth consulship or dies.' That is true: he can be described as 'ter consul' from the day on which he enters his third consulship because 'ter consul' means in effect 'having three consulships to his credit'. But the only way in which his third consulship can be used to date events which happened during its course is to say that they happened while he was consul for the third time—that is, in Latin before the fourth century, while he was *consul tertium* (or *tertio*). It is a familiar story how in 52 B.C., when Pompeius was finishing the temple of Venus Victrix (rather than Victoria: see Mommsen in *CIL* i², p. 323, col. 1) attached to his new theatre, the 'doctissimi ciuitatis' could not agree about the Latin for 'consul for the third time' (Gellius 10, 1, 7). Some said that it was 'consul tertium' (a view to which Varro seems subsequently to have committed himself in his book about arithmetic: Gellius l.c. 6; cf. Nonius, p. 435 M., 700 f. L.), others that it was 'consul tertio'; and Cicero, shirking the issue, persuaded Pompeius 'ut neque "tertium" neque "tertio" perscriberetur, sed ad secundum usque t fierent litterae'. But nothing is heard of 'consul ter', for the very good reason that it would not have said what was meant. So too, if Suetonius had wanted to indicate that Caesar's first marriage happened in the fourth consulship of Cinna, his words would have been not

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'Cinnae quater consulis' but 'Cinnae quartum (or, quarto) consulis'. That he did not want to do so is strongly suggested by the fact that he had already given the date just above in the phrase 'sequentibusque consulibus'—a phrase which the loss of the beginning of the *Life* has unfortunately deprived of its precision.

Once a man's third consulship was over he was strictly no longer *consul tertium* but *consul ter*, which he remained until his fourth consulship began. Likewise also, since the numerals following the so-called 'cognomen imperatoris' express the number of times that something has happened in the past to the person concerned, the proper form in such places is the adverb of frequency: there is nothing incorrect, as D. McFayden seems to suggest (*The History of the Title Imperator under the Roman Empire*—Chicago, 1920—4, n. 15), in the description of Pompeius Magnus, as one who had celebrated three triumphs (Cic. *pro Balbo* 16), as *τρίς αὐτοκράτωρ* (ILS 8776). Nevertheless, signs are not lacking that, particularly in imperial titulatures, there was a tendency to depart from the severest logical and grammatical rectitude by using the ordinal adverbs where purism would demand the adverbs of frequency. In Latin inscriptions the representation of numbers by the numerical *notae* becomes so regular early in the principate of Augustus (see Mommsen on *CIL* xii, 3148–9) that direct evidence for the diction is too slight to be adequate; but Greek epigraphy has a clue to offer. A text like *IGRR* i, 960, which reads *ἐνὶ Αὐτοκράτορι Κ[αίσαρι] | θεοῦ υἱῷ*

Σε[βα]στῷ, δη[μ]αρχικῆς ἐ[ξο]υσίας εἰκοστῷ [., ὑπ[α]ρ[χ]ῶ τρις καὶ [δε]κάκις is a rare exception. By far the commonest practice is that which may be illustrated by *IGRR* i, 983, where in a text of A.D. 106–7 Trajan is described (whether accurately or not, so far as the numbers are concerned, is immaterial) as *δημαρχικῆς ἐξουσί[ας] | τὸ ια', αὐτοκράτωρ τὸ ε', ὑπατος [τὸ] | ε'*. Here τὸ ια' and τὸ ε' correspond to *undecimum* and *quintum* respectively; but, whereas *undecimum* satisfies the most exacting requirements as an intimation that Trajan's current tenure of the *tribunicia potestas* was his eleventh, the *quintum* implied by τὸ ε' is less impeccable than *quinquies* (*πεντάκις*) would have been in giving the totals of his salutations and, since he had been *consul quintum* in A.D. 103, of his consulships. The reasons why in these contexts the ordinal adverbs seem to have made their appearance where adverbs of frequency would have been more appropriate are here irrelevant: their intrusion is only to be noticed as a reminder of the stricter usage. But this development does nothing to authorize the assumption that its contrary occurred as well. Though ordinal adverbs are found where adverbs of frequency might have been expected, the use of adverbs of frequency as ordinals is not confirmed before the fourth century; and he would be an optimist who set out to prove that in the time of Suetonius 'Cinnae quater consulis' meant anything but 'of the Cinna who was four times consul'.

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PINDAR, *PYTH.* viii. 40

CURRENT texts of Pindar differ in the order of the first two words of l. 40 of the *Eighth Pythian*: *νιός Θήβας* or *Θήβας νιός*. In fact *νιός Θήβας* is the reading of all MSS., and *Θήβας νιός* is a metrical correction by Erasmus Schmid: yet no editor, I think, since Christ has given a critical note. Fennell, Gildersleeve, Sandys, and Farnell, who silently follow the MSS., are in a strong position, but unfortunately Schroeder's slip, in his *editio maior* of 1900, of printing in his text Schmid's emendation as if it were the MS. reading, has been silently followed in his own *editio minor*, and also

by both the Budé and Oxford editors. Schroeder, indeed, in the introductory metrical notes of his *editio maior* mentions *Θήβας νιός* as Schmid's emendation, and he plainly meant to follow the MSS. in his text, since he keeps *νίκας τρισσάκις* (as do the Budé and Oxford editors) in the corresponding place of l. 80, without sharing Schmid's simple faith that such words as *τρισσάκις* and *ἑπτάκις* can be scanned as iambi. Since none of the three editions most used by students gives any indication of the MS. reading, it seems worth while to call attention to the facts, although they are not in dispute.

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THEOPHRASTUS ON ΠΟΡΟΣ (ΠΩΡΟΣ)

De Lap. 7 καὶ ὁ πόρος ὁμοίος τῷ χρώματι καὶ τῇ πυκνότητι τῷ Παρίῳ, τὴν δὲ κοινότητα μόνον ἔχων τοῦ πόρου, διὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς σπουδαζομένοις οἰκήμασιν ὥσπερ διάζωμα τῶνάσιν αὐτὸν οἱ Αἰγύπτιοι.

'There is also (the) *poros*, which is similar to Parian (marble) in colour and solidity and possesses only the lightness of *poros*: for this reason the Egyptians use it as a cornice in fine architecture.'

This is usually taken to be a general description of *poros*. See L. & S.⁹ s.v. *πῶρος*: 'a stone used in building, described by Thphr. *Lap.* 7... as a kind of marble, like the Parian in colour and solidity, but lighter'.¹ Other writers,² without concluding that *poros* is a kind of marble, agree that the passage applies to *poros* in general. Thus Frazer remarks: 'No stone could be more unlike the glistening, white Parian marble... than the... dull-coloured conglomerate to which Pausanias gives the name of *poros*.' But before accepting this criticism we may look for another interpretation.

Now the *poros* 'is similar to Parian marble in colour and solidity and possesses only the lightness of *poros*'. If this is a general description, the remark in italics is absurd, for to explain that *poros* has the lightness of *poros* is to explain nothing. It may be noted that authorities habitually slur over 'and possesses only the lightness of *poros*'. L. & S. write 'but lighter', Frazer writes 'but not so heavy', Pliny (*N.H.* xxxvii. 132) 'minus tantum ponderosus'.

The wording itself suggests that a special *poros* found in Egypt is referred to here. To imply that this *poros* combined the merits of Parian marble with the lightness of ordinary Greek *poros* would be reasonable, since Greek *poros* would be familiar enough to Theophrastus' readers. Although the words do not in themselves necessarily suggest that an Egyptian variety is under consideration, we may note that of three other stones mentioned in *Lap.* 6-7 two are stated to be Egyptian.³ Thus the sentence belongs to a context of which much, if not all, is concerned with Egypt. Taken in conjunction with this context it loses most of its ambiguity.⁴

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¹ It is true that L. & S. go on to contrast this stone with the native conglomerate of Olympia discussed by Frazer (see below). But this does not alter the fact that Theophrastus' statement has every appearance of being taken as a general description: indeed it is printed as the first reference.

² E.g. Frazer, *Pausanias's Description of Greece*, iii. 502-3, and Casson, *Technique of Early Greek Sculpture*, pp. 72-3.

³ These are the 'alabastrites' (6) and 'a black, transparent stone found there', i.e. in Egypt, the last place to be mentioned (7). The third stone, the 'chernites' (6), is of unknown provenance, but its presence here points to Egypt as its place of origin.

⁴ I am much indebted to Dr. Stanley Smith,

THE PERACHORA DRACHMA INSCRIPTION

THE dedicatory inscription published in *Perachora* (p. 257), which appears to refer to the deposit in the Temple of Hera of a 'drachma', and can be dated to shortly before 650 B.C., is no doubt connected, as Professor Wade-Gery suggests, with the monetary reform of Pheidon of Argos. But it may be questioned whether he is right in taking the object dedicated to have been one of the old bundles of spits which had been accepted as currency in southern Greece under the name of drachmas.

It was presumably these bundles which Aristotle had in mind when he referred to iron as one of the commodities which had been used in early trade as a medium of exchange.¹ The actual utility value of a bundle to an individual holder would naturally vary; but for convenience of reckoning a conventional value seems to have been attached to it, and the bundle became a token, and its name a term of value. This would serve well for local trade; but, when the Greeks began to develop an overseas trade—according to Thucydides, about 700 B.C.²—they realized that a handier form of currency would be useful, and the Aeginetans, the most active in this new trade, adopted from the Asiatic cities the practice of stamping ingots of precious metal with their badge. In the first instance, as Aristotle says, these passed by weight—i.e. as bullion—but Pheidon conceived the idea of giving the Aeginetan stater a fixed exchange value, and relating it to the old drachma currency: so at Argos the silver stater of Aegina became a token worth two iron drachma-tokens, and the half-stater was called a drachma, which was, if the original sense of the word is considered, a misnomer.

Perachora was a Corinthian temple; and Pheidon could not dictate to the Corinthians the value to be attached to one of his tokens. But at this period trade relationships between Argos and Corinth were close, and there must have been plenty of Aeginetan staters in the hands of Corinthian merchants. It would obviously be convenient for them to accept the Argive valuation, knowing that they had only to take the coins a few miles to secure the full exchange; and so there is no difficulty in supposing that the new drachma would be recognized at Corinth. But, while merchants who dealt with Argos would know quickly the meaning of the change, the average Corinthian would think that a drachma was what it had always been to him, a bundle of spits; and it would be practically essential to give him a sort of official assurance that the little lump of silver was to be taken as the equivalent of such a bundle. The easiest way of doing this was by exhibiting a sample of the new currency in a temple: if Hera accepted the coin, he had her

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¹ Arist. *Pol.* i. 9. 7.

² Thuc. i. 13.

guarantee that all was well. In view of this, it may be suggested that the object dedicated was not an iron drachma, but an Aeginetan half-stater; and instead of Professor Wade-Gery's restoration of the broken inscription

Δραχμα εγω hera λευ[ολενε κειμαι εν αυ]λαι

I, a drachma, O white-armed Hera, am deposited in the court

we may perhaps read

Δραχμα εγω· hera λευ[ολενε δεξο μ' εν αυ]λαι

I am a drachma: white-armed Hera, accept me in the court.

If this is adopted, a reason appears for the removal of the dedication from its place of honour in the temple and the use of the stone as building material within a few years of its original erection. This is stated to have taken place about 650 B.C.; and this is the date assigned by Ravel to the first issue of coinage on the Corinthian standard. As this standard gave only about half as much silver to the drachma as the Aeginetan, a revision of the definition of a drachma, so far as Corinth was concerned, was necessary; and the old exhibit was scrapped.

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REVIEWS

THE SOCIETY OF ARISTOPHANES

VICTOR EHRENBERG: *The People of Aristophanes. A Sociology of Old Attic Comedy*. Pp. xii+320; 19 plates. Oxford: Blackwell, 1943. Cloth, 25s. net.

READERS of this book will feel strong sympathy and admiration for the author, who has completed a valuable piece of work in exile and in a language not his own. His object (p. 5) is 'to find out not only the facts of external life, but the psychological reactions to them, both of individuals and of society . . . to make clear the atmosphere created by the social and economic conditions of life, and to characterize, in its variety and its unity, the people who had their existence in these conditions', and he fully justifies his belief that Comedy is a peculiarly good source of information both as to the facts and as to the reactions to them. There are chapters considering in both aspects the Farmers, the Upper Classes, Traders and Craftsmen, Citizens and Foreigners, Slaves, Family and Neighbours, Money and Property (with a discussion of prices and salaries), Religion and Education, Economics and the State, and the People and the State. Under each of these headings (with their sub-headings) he has obviously made a complete collection of all the relevant passages in Aristophanes and the fragments of the Old Comedy, and he has written round them a text orderly in its arrangement, but so compact in treatment and style as to be, at times, very stiff reading, particularly for one who looks out all

or most of the references (for very few passages are quoted); but the treatment is so thorough and accurate as a whole that the work will not have to be done again. What is said below by way of criticism must not be taken as seriously qualifying this judgement.

Two introductory chapters are about the Old Comedy in general, and about each comedy of Aristophanes in particular. The author shows perhaps some failure to realize how much in the Old Comedies may be explained by the known or probable origins of Greek Comedy. The constant adoption of the rustic point of view is largely due to its having begun in a rustic *κῶμος*, and the blending of this with a (probably) Dorian farce in which certain stock characters recurred explains some features which puzzle the author in the poets' treatment of certain stock characters, particularly (esp. pp. 171, 198 f.) Socrates, who is conceived by the comic poets on the lines of the traditional *ἀλαζὼν σοφός*. The *Miles Gloriosus*, of whom a good description is given on pp. 214 f., was another of these traditional characters, and it is probable that the conflict between Youth and Age, Father and Son, goes back (as the author notes on p. 152) to the earliest days of Comedy and Farce. (On the other hand, the final scene in many Old Comedies is, I think, wrongly explained on p. 185 by reference to the *ἱερὸς γάμος*. I have discussed these questions of origins at length elsewhere.)

The author seems sometimes to

ascribe too much seriousness to a good deal that was sheer fun, such as the political 'views' of Aristophanes when he was scarcely more than a boy; the poet then and always took his fun where he found it, without worrying too much about consistency; and it is very doubtful whether current events were always introduced 'for the definite purpose of making the audience think as well as laugh' (p. 23). I return to this later; a few minor points in the first two chapters may be noted here.

It is only partly true (for the fifth century) that the actors were chosen by the archon. There is no evidence at all that comedies had any part in the *proagon* (p. 19), and a comedy would have suffered much more than a tragedy by a previous declaration of subject and (possibly) of treatment. On p. 21 there is a very obscure and doubtful interpretation of Kratinos, fr. 323. The assertion (p. 30) that 'Life in New Comedy apes life, but was shut off from reality' is not true, if it means that the kind of things that happen in New Comedy did not happen in the real life of the time. I do not understand the statement (p. 32) that 'the purely political theme hardly recurs at all in the *Acharnians*'; indeed, the author himself suggests (p. 33) that the award of the first prize to the play expressed 'not only artistic appreciation, but political opinion'. There is really nothing strange about the 'Rural Dionysia' in this play (p. 33): it simply illustrates the idea that, with the making of peace, country life may begin again in its most cheerful (and homeliest) form. The idea that knights, peasants, manufacturers, and shopkeepers formed one 'social and psychological whole' (p. 37) remains something of an exaggeration; the attempt in ch. iv to demonstrate unity of view between peasants and knights also rests on little more than the fact that both disliked Kleon. The treatment of Meton in the *Birds* (p. 45) is taken much too seriously when it is used to prove that 'to Aristophanes intellectual pursuits were as wicked a source of economic gain as politics'; Aristophanes saw that he could make

fun of Meton and he did so. The proof of the existence of a 'labour front' (p. 55) is quite insufficient.

The chapters which form the main part of the work are very careful, thorough, and interesting, and take into account also the evidence of Plato, Xenophon (and pseudo-Xenophon), and others. The points for criticism are not many and most of them not very serious; but a few may be mentioned. The description of the Athenian aristocrats in ch. iv is almost a caricature, every suggestion or innuendo of Aristophanes being taken at its face value, and an individual's faults taken as typical of a whole class. I do not know what is in the author's mind when he says (p. 142) that we are given some glimpses of Athenian indoor life, 'sometimes by the use of the *ἐκκύκλημα*'; at least there is nothing typical about the 'indoor life' of Euripides or Agathon as revealed by the *ἐκκύκλημα* in the Comedies. I believe that he is wrong in concluding (p. 148) that women did not attend the theatre, and his note (p. 269) almost admits that the evidence is against him. That the 'average Greek' (whoever he may have been) 'as a rule owned only one cloak and one pair of shoes' is certainly not proved by the citation of Bleepyrus and his friend (p. 169). There is some overstatement (p. 192) in regard to the supposed lack of reverence of the ordinary Athenian for the gods; after all, Demeter, Apollo, and Artemis appear in no comedy, and when they are mentioned it is with respect. (The jest in Aristoph., fr. 684, was against the Delphians, not against Apollo.) The case of Zeus is more difficult; it may be suspected that his 'universality' partly expressed itself in the large number of scandalous stories about him, and that in fact he was not very near to the personal or corporate life of the ordinary citizen, as (e.g.) Demeter and Athena were, so that the citizen's stock of reverence was used up, so to speak, on the gods who were closer to him—but it would take too long to discuss this here. In ch. xii the account of the 'Megarian Decree' contains a good deal

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of controversial matter, and the description of the *polis* as 'a state without formal sovereignty and based not on territory but on men' may give rise to some misunderstanding. I think it is misleading to attribute to Aristophanes a knowledge of 'the struggle of ideas represented in the two words *φύσις* and *νόμος*'. His antagonism to the new education was based on its effects as he saw them, more than on any profound understanding. There is some rather rash criticism on pp. 257 f. of Plato and Aristotle, who are as likely as the author to have known the truth about their own times; and I feel that the account of Comedy on the following pages greatly exaggerates its supposed inconsistency. Moreover, to say that it was characterized by 'the lack of any clear, detached and more-than-individual standpoint, and the lack of any uncompromising reverence or respect' is only to say that it was

Comedy, and not statesmanship, philosophy, or religion; and the statement that 'Comedy is permeated by the same spirit as that which led the people to the decisions about Mytilene, about the victors of Arginusae, and about Sokrates' seems to be almost entirely untrue. The world of Comedy is of course a world of people who 'like to do what they like' and to enjoy themselves; but this is not 'individualism', political or philosophic, and to call the comic poet a seducer and a demagogue is an absurdity from which the author might have been saved by a more vivid sense of fun. But some other parts of the summing up in the 'Conclusion' are true and well expressed.

There are unfortunately a good many misprints and wrong accents, and *βέραι* on p. 186 is an unfortunate plural. But the illustrations are well chosen and attractive.

A. W. PICKARD-CAMBRIDGE.

AESCHYLUS

Eduard FRAENKEL: *Aeschylus: Old Texts and New Problems*. (From the Proceedings of the British Academy, vol. xxviii.) Pp. 24. London: Milford, 1943. Paper, 2s. net.

THE first half discusses the new papyrus fragments, the second six passages in the *Agamemnon*; but these two subjects are connected, like those in the first movement of a symphony, by a 'bridge', and to this item the lecture owes its unity. Here we are justly urged to apply to the study of the extant dramas the same freshness and thoroughness, the same freedom from prepossessions and diligence in observation of all conceivably relevant facts, which necessity enforces and novelty stimulates in the editors of new papyri. It is in ostensible illustration of this principle that object lessons are thereupon drawn from the *Agamemnon*.

The exposition of the fragments is wholly admirable. Contenting himself as regards the *Niobe* with a statement, exemplary in precision and compression, of the main facts and the general dilemma, Fraenkel devotes four pages

to the satyr-play *Dictyoulkoi*, which he interprets with care and sympathy and indeed with charm. It deserves no less. 'Aeschylus seems to know all about children.' A fragment, due in the forthcoming volume of *Ox. Pap.*, from *Prometheus Fire-Lighter* is discussed in connexion with Attic vases which illustrate the play, and this and the *Isthmiasae* (again, learnedly and pleasantly handled) are shown to exemplify the tendency of satyr-drama to celebrate the origin of an invention.

But the items from the *Agamemnon* represent (except 811, which is interestingly discussed) a very different type of problem; we pass from literary appreciation to textual analysis, and here, I regret to say, I can find little but a series of acute disappointments. The more Fraenkel enunciates his ideals of method (above summarized), the less he seems able to apply them; he will do anything with a textual problem rather than open it. He starts from a point on the surface and works inward; but never far. In these five cases he seeks (very properly as I believe) a decision;

but he attempts, however unconsciously, to force the decision by narrowing the field. At 1427 f. (his own 'ff.' is unjustified) he is hallooing, not before he is out of the wood, but before he is in it; he does not even see what the problem is. In fairness to him I have asked leave of the Editors of *C.R.* to substantiate this complaint elsewhere in this issue (see pp. 9-11). At 393, where he concentrates on the single word *δικαιωθεῖς*, he strangely presents his issue as a choice between two meanings, a right and a wrong; the question could only be whether, in the sentence 'like bad metal he . . . becomes black and stands (judged, i.e.) condemned', this last expression is (as is regularly assumed) to be *applied* to the metal as well as to the man; the traditional translation 'tested', which he censures, was of course an attempt to bridge the gulf ('condemned' will actually do so), whereas 'brought to sentence' only darkens counsel. With the many real difficulties of this context he does not deal. At 613-16 his whole procedure seems to me as short-sighted as it is tortuous; and he grievously misrepresents Headlam. Headlam's note

(how often do good critics suffer thus!) elaborates his supports and not his reason; his reason he plainly thought (fond hope!) was—whether right or wrong—self-evident. His reason lay just in the sphere which Fraenkel now declares that he habitually neglected: it is Headlam who has here his eye on the drama, the situation; it is Fraenkel who is fussing about superficialities—and who misapplies even these. He first accepts the exit of Clytemnestra on the conclusion of her speech, and then employs against the manuscript attribution of 613-14 to the Herald an argument which must depend for its validity upon the Queen's presence, in which event 615-16 *would* be the 'reply' (i.e. to her, or virtually so) which he here calls it, after calling it a 'comment' above.

The style of the new papyrus fragments is fluent, elegant, and lucid; it shows a complete command of expression. That is their main significance for all who would now reopen the cruces of the *Agamemnon*.

A. Y. CAMPBELL.

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THE LOEB JOSEPHUS

Josephus. With an English Translation by Ralph MARCUS. Vol. VII: *Jewish Antiquities*, Books XII-XIV. (Loeb Classical Library.) Pp. viii+788. London: Heinemann, 1943. Cloth, 10s. (leather, 12s. 6d.) net.

It is a pleasure to welcome another instalment of Dr. Marcus's translation of *Josephus' Antiquities*, former volumes of which have been noticed in *C.R.* This one contains Books XII-XIV, running from the death of Alexander to the end of the Hasmonean dynasty. The translation is both accurate and easy to read; textual problems and disputed readings are well handled, and the notes are just what is required. *Josephus' chronology*, often confused and sometimes inaccurate, is carefully elucidated throughout, as are the allied and difficult questions of the datings of the sabbatical years and, too often, of

deciding which king's reign *Josephus* means. Much trouble has been taken over the identification of the numerous obscure place-names mentioned in the Maccabean wars; here Dr. Marcus has been helped by his knowledge of Hebrew and of Jewish literature. Very useful are the running references to the *Bellum Judaicum* and 1 *Maccabees*, which enable the reader to follow easily *Josephus' variations* from these works in the relevant parts of the *Antiquities*. There are thirteen Appendixes (A being an ancient table of contents), but only three are discussions: B dates Simon the Just to c. 200 B.C.; C decides that it is most improbable that Jews got special privileges from any Seleucid before Antiochus III; D deals with Antiochus III, and inclines to regard his letters to Ptolemy and Zeuxis as genuine. Owing to illness and pressure

of work, the remaining nine, E to M, are only lists of selected literature on their several subjects; one regrets both the absence of Dr. Marcus's own views on the Hellenistic and Roman decrees in these books (Appendix J) and its cause, but something can perhaps be gathered from the note (p. 587) on the notorious decree of Sardis. For the same reason, treatment of the most important question these books raise, the civic rights of the Jews in Alexandria and the Hellenistic cities generally, is reserved for the last volume of the series (ix), together with Appendixes on Josephus' sources and on the Jewish sects; as regards all the problems, Dr. Marcus promises a history of the second Jewish commonwealth after this translation is finished.

The book is so good that to note trifles may seem ungrateful. It is a pity that *ἀσεβείς*, the technical term for the Hellenizing Jews, while correctly translated 'the godless' in xiii, should be rendered 'impious' or 'irreligious'

in xii; its opposite in Josephus is not *εὐσεβείς*, pious, but *θεοσεβείς*, God-fearing (xii. 284, in Mattathias' dying speech). In xiii. 186, *εἰ γένοιτ' αὐτῷ* (Demetrius II) *δύναμις* is not 'acquire a force of his own' (he had one) but 'become powerful'. xii. 426, *φάλαγξ* is hardly 'main body'; it is 'battle line', a common meaning. xii. 295, *τῆς κάτωθεν Ἀσίας* is (pace the note) clear enough; it is 'Asia towards the sea-coast' (Syria and Palestine) as opposed to 'the upper satrapies' (*ἄνω*, 'inland'; a regular meaning of *κατά* and *ἀνά*) a few lines on. Two notes are inadequate: p. 31, *b*, the difference between the 72 elders of Pseudo-Aristeas and the 70 of Josephus is not due to Josephus' carelessness; and p. 629, *b*, 'most of the Parthian soldiers were' not 'slaves'; I have dealt with both these matters elsewhere, the first exhaustively. But small sunspots do not affect the sun.

W. W. TARN.

Muirtown, Inverness.

ETERNAL ROME

Edward Kennard RAND: *The Building of Eternal Rome*. Pp. xi+318. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press (London: Milford), 1943. Cloth, 20s. net.

This book may perhaps suggest a reason why so much of high quality can continue to be written about the destinies of Rome. Each earnest student receives in turn his own revelation of Eternal Rome and is moved to record it for the benefit of other men. Prof. Rand's version is that of a scholar, to whom ideas mean more than facts, great literature than high finance or big business. It is none the worse for that. One can feel behind it all the time 'il lungo studio ed il lungo amore', which cannot be mistaken when they are present, or counterfeited when they are not.

Chapter I (Foundations) cites Polybius, Cato the Elder, Ennius, and Cicero as witnesses to the genius of the Roman Republic—Livy is held over to the next chapter. The uncertainty of

the early history is emphasized. Even for the later we are made to feel how few and uncertain are the lights on which we have to depend.

Chapter II (Ideal Empire) reveals the best hopes of the Republic realized in the Empire of Augustus. Livy, Virgil, Horace, Augustus are called to explain and interpret the theme. It is most satisfying to find the writers of the Golden Age treated with due respect as forces to be reckoned with—not as mere courtiers of supple and obsequious manners.

Chapter III (Roman High Seriousness and Roman Laughter)—a trifle discursive, but delightful in its detail—illustrates the extreme poles of Roman character from such writers as Catullus, Virgil, Horace, Lucilius, Naevius, Terence, and Cicero. One is left wondering how far Romans had a sense of humour, as modern England has understood it.

Chapter IV (The Ivory Gate) may have been intended to be—as it indeed is—elusive. It might have been more

effective if it had been more distinctly focused. It is mainly concerned with romance and magic art in the poets Virgil, Horace, Ovid; but what are we to make of the closing pages with the death of Augustus, and the comment, 'Whatever Virgil intended by his Ivory Gate, he would have known, had he lived to see his sovereign die, that the Ideal Empire had ended in sublimity'? Professor Rand clearly sees some close connexion between magic poetry and Ideal Empire, but it might have been made clearer to his readers.

Chapter V (Decline and Fall) carries only too clear a meaning. But when does the decay begin? Not in the Antonine Age, pleads Professor Rand, and interposes an admirable defence of the much maligned Fronto, the beloved tutor of Marcus Aurelius. Silver Latin literature in general does not suggest gloomy apprehensions. Seneca is so good, if you will only read and appreciate him for yourself, and Tacitus binds you with his style and moral authority. Perhaps Professor Rand hardly allows himself or us to realize how serious are the grounds on which the historian stands charged with a lack of 'candor' towards the Empire. A glance into the unmistakable decline of the third century reveals some fascinating new views of Gallienus and his age, due to the enthusiasm and insight of the Hungarian scholar, Andreas Alföldi.

Chapter VI (the Roman City of God) passes the great 'Divide'—the Christian revolution—and shows us the Roman genius, in the persons of an Arnobius, a Lactantius, or an Augustine, learning to think and speak in the new idiom.

Chapter VII (New Rome) looks out from antiquity to the Middle Ages and modern times. New Rome of the East, Byzantium, keeps her long vigil over civilization on the Bosphorus, and old Rome of the Tiber is still haunted by memories of past greatness.

Chapter VIII (The Eternal City) links past and present in one great scheme, with Dante, the Society of Jesus, and the Mass carrying something of an ancient and grand tradition to the modern world. A pleasant dream, in which great Romans of many ages confer wisely and wittily with the author on problems of yesterday and to-day, brings a delightful book to an appropriate end.

In conclusion, a few points of detail. P. 25. 'Pacique imponere morem', 'to build order upon peace'. Surely *mos* needs definition. May we not keep the old 'paxis'? P. 54, n. 52. It is satisfactory to find Servius' story of the praises of Gallus in the Fourth Georgic retained against Anderson's indecisive objections. Pp. 68 ff. The explanation and interpretation of Horace's *Carmen Saeculare* is admirably firm and convincing. P. 107, n. 65. '*Dic mihi, adulescens, fuit aliquando mater tua Roma?*' *Negavit ille nec contentus adiecit 'sed pater meus saepe!'*' The words "'You see", said the Emperor', interpolated after *negavit* ('No, Your Majesty'), make hay of the story. P. 145, n. 2. Here, and in one or two other places, the quotation has suffered some violence in proof. *ἄλλαν ἄνω ὄντω ὠθεσκε ποτὶ λόφον. ἀλλ' ὅτε μέλλοι* (second line) *does* convey a sense of wasted effort—but it is an improvement on Homer. P. 213. Whatever instinct may say about the close relation of the *Pervigilium Veneris* to Apuleius, a clear historical reference seems to anchor it near A.D. 300.

Professor Rand has written a book that is neither exactly history nor literary criticism and perhaps loses part of its definition in consequence. But he has communicated to us something of his intimate, personal sense of the enduring greatness of Rome, and has enriched our minds with fresh and noble illustrations of his theme.

HAROLD MATTINGLY.

British Museum.

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EMENDATIONS IN CICERO'S LETTERS

W. J. SEDGEFIELD: *Locorum nonnullorum in Epistulis M. T. Ciceronis mendose descriptorum emendationes*. Pp. 15. London: privately printed, 1942. Paper.

HERE are seventy-two suggestions for the betterment of the text of Cicero's *Letters*. Most concern the letters to Atticus and a large number deal with desperate *cruces*. Thus the boldness of the undertaking is at once apparent. The author is guided by a theory that the scribe behind all our manuscripts was peculiarly addicted to haplography. 'Soon it became apparent', he says, 'that if in a passage certain letter-groups were repeated . . . , an intelligible reading was obtained. We thereupon tried this method upon all the other corrupt passages, with the unexpected result that in most cases the passages yielded a straightforward, unrestrained meaning which fitted the context and conformed to Cicero's epistolary style.' The justice of this claim must, however, be a matter of opinion.

The result is that we have a few emendations here which future editors may ponder over, e.g. at *Att.* v. 20. 1 'inde in oppidis iis quae erant mirabiliter accepti . . . venimus', *quae quierant* ('in those towns which had settled down after the Parthian scare') is suggested; *Att.* x. 6. 1 'et tamen recitet et meas cogitationes omnes explicavi', read . . . *res ciet et me. Meas* But in the great majority of the proposals one cannot have any confidence, and when, at *Att.* v. 3. 3, 'nostra continentia et diligentia esse satisfaciemus' *Δ* (*satisfaciemus satis Δ*) is expanded by this method to 'nostra continentia et diligentia egentissimis semissibvs ibi vsitatīs satisfaciemus', one feels that the limit has been somewhat overstepped. It may be unfair to single out this extreme instance, especially as the author merely

'ventures to suggest' that Cicero may have written it, but it does show the dangers into which emendators are easily led by too eagerly following such a theory. Some of Sedgefield's emendations seem unnecessary either because the manuscripts give an understandable reading or because the passage has already been satisfactorily restored, as e.g. at *Fam.* viii. 5. 3 and *Att.* xv. 1a. 2 where the word *volup* in the emendation does not commend itself. Others do not yield Ciceronian Latin (e.g. *Att.* ii. 7. 1 where 'qui absciram' is altered to *quia absque ira eram* 'because my indignation had passed away', and *Att.* xiii. 40. 1, where we have *ut* introducing an independent question), while one or two do not fit the context.

The author will not have it that there is any 'ingenuity' about his proposals. But there is no reason why a good emendation should not be ingenious, and there is ingenuity here; only it has been misapplied. For the probability that Cicero did not write what Sedgefield makes him write is too great to make this type of emendation—so apt to become a fascinating game—a profitable pursuit, and the lengthier the emendation the greater are the odds against its correctness.

But not to end in a carping spirit I may cite a suggestion of another kind of which there are several. At *Att.* vii. 3. 9 'Hortensii legata cognovi nunc aveo scire quid hominis sit', Sedgefield would alter *hominis* to *nominis* and translate 'what the debts are'.

There are several false references. Read for *Att.* i. 16. 3, i. 16. 13; for ix. 19. 6, ix. 10. 6; for xv. 1. 2, xv. 1a. 2; for *Att.* xvi. 23. 1, *Fam.* xvi. 23. 1. *Att.* v. 7. 1, xv. 29. 2, xvi. 32. 8 are also wrong but I have not run the correct references to earth. At *Att.* xiii. 20. 4 *ego* should be *ago*.

E. J. WOOD.

University of Leeds.

SYMMACHUS

John Alexander McGeachy: *Quintus Aurelius Symmachus and the Senatorial Aristocracy of the West*. Pp. iii + 203. Chicago: private edition distributed by the University of Chicago Libraries, 1942. Paper.

THE author of this Ph.D. thesis in the Department of History of the University of Chicago 'undertakes to study Symmachus as a representative of the nobility of the Late Roman Empire'. He has chapters on Symmachus' works, on the aristocracy and the Imperial Government, on the aristocracy in the economic life of the Empire, on their social life, on their attitude in the religious struggle, and on their literary and intellectual interests. He has read and digested most of what has been written on Symmachus, and gives a very competent survey of the principal points.

It is a pity that the author did not take more trouble over his own translations from Symmachus; these are nearly always bare and awkward, and sometimes definitely wrong. For instance in *Ep.* i. 24 he mistranslates *mihi fraudi non erit*; in *Ep.* v. 78 he takes *culturis* to mean 'studies' instead of 'crops'; in iv. 32. 2 he has misunderstood the construction; in i. 95. 3 he makes nonsense of a perfectly clear sentence and appears not to have grasped the historical reference; in i. 19. 4 he mistakes the meaning of *figmenta ludicra* 'tales of sport', which he translates as 'ludicrous fancies'. The bibliography should have included J. R. Palanque, *Saint Ambroise et l'Empire romain*.

The best and most interesting part of the thesis is the chapter in which the author analyses the attitude of Symmachus and the other pagan senators in the controversy about the *ara Victoriae*. He rightly emphasizes the fact that the removal of the altar from the Senate-house was in itself a matter of minor importance, and that the real struggle was concerned with other matters, the confiscation by the *fiscus* of the subvention long given by the State to the Vestal Virgins and to the

pagan priesthood for the upkeep of public religious ceremonies, and the legislation which forbade the bequest of landed property to priestly corporations. And, without denying to the pagan opposition the possession of 'sincere religious motives', he infers that they were partly influenced by the threat to their own privileged social and economic position involved in the anti-pagan measures of the Christian emperors. There is, no doubt, a good deal of truth in this as a general statement of the probabilities of the situation. But the author goes farther and denies to Symmachus the possession of 'any deep religious convictions': his 'faithful allegiance . . . to the national religion of Rome' he traces to his 'respect for the traditions of senatorial position' and to his feelings as a 'Roman gentleman'. For this conclusion he gives two reasons: one that 'the gods of the old Roman pantheon were no longer awe-inspiring', the other that Symmachus shows no interest in 'the Oriental mystery religions, wherein lay the real strength of the pagan movement of the Late Empire'. These reasons will not bear any close examination. It is impossible to rely upon the argument *ex silentio* in the case of letters so mannered and formal as those of Symmachus, and in the *relatio* Symmachus is developing a traditional argument, which St. Augustine in the *De civitate Dei* spends many pages in rebutting, drawn from a long religious history to which, as St. Ambrose (*Ep.* xviii. 32) in his reply to Symmachus' *relatio* points out, the mystery religions, *alieni ritus*, had nothing to say. Even if Symmachus had little sympathy, as may quite possibly be the case, with many of these oriental rites, that in itself would have no bearing upon the depth of his own religious convictions; and it is hard to read the *relatio* without the feeling that the *tam grande mysterium*, to knowledge of which he and St. Ambrose alike aspired, *non uno itinere*, meant a great deal to him.

University of St. Andrews. R. M. HENRY.

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MEDITERRANEAN CULTURE

J. L. MYRES: *Mediterranean Culture*. (The Frazer Lecture, 1943.) Pp. 52. Cambridge: University Press, 1943. Paper, 2s. net.

PROFESSOR MYRES presents this lecture 'if not quite historical geography, as an essay in geographical history'. Indeed, it is History in the original Hecataean and Herodotean sense, 'inquiry' into the experience of man in his physical environment, how it determines his activities and his thoughts, and what he chooses to remember and record. It is a diagnosis of those 'controls', physical and biological, which have made the Mediterranean basin 'unique as a home for man', and, within a wide but very precisely limited range of variety, have made possible a 'good life' for the 'fundamental trinity-in-unity' of its human population. The ultimate bed-rock of that life, which emerges to the surface again and again in history when the elaborate superstructures—Greek *πόλις*, Roman *municipium*, medieval Italian city—have fallen by violence or decay, is found to be the *κώμη*—Aristotle's *κοινωνία πρώτη χρήσεως ἔνεκεν μὴ ἑφ' ἑμέρου*, which Aristotle, however, barely mentions as he hastens on to the *πόλις* which to him is the one type of society really worthy of philosophical examination. The *κώμη* is 'an association of hereditary groups engaged in the same food-quest, and administered by a more or less formal council of the heads of these groups'. The pattern of it is still there to be recognized all over the Mediterranean shores, and especially in the islands, from Sardinia to Cyprus, in village cultures, pottery, dress, domestic building, as well as in things determined by strictly geographical factors—recognized, that is, by such as have a real 'historian's' eye like Professor Myres's.

But having established the priority of this village or 'deme' culture—for we are reminded of the original meaning of *δῆμος*, which remains, half-forgotten, in its later political uses (*δημοκρατία*

as 'government by country cousins', despised and resented by the 'polite' or at any rate knowing *ἀστέιοι* or *ἀγοραῖοι*)—he goes on to diagnose the wider combinations and more complex economic and political organisms of which it is the fundamental tissue: on the one hand, the 'bazaar' and the 'sanctuary' which come into existence to satisfy needs and desires, material and spiritual, beyond the 'traditional and austere routine' of the village life; and on the other, the *δυναστεία*, the 'rule of force', which erects itself when a warrior house or caste, economically parasitic, begins to exploit the cultivators—it may be by such special means as the Barbary horse, which occupies a characteristically suggestive and tantalizing paragraph: 'the later horse-using dynasties are the only large superstructures which at first sight seem to be indigenous in the Mediterranean'—and, again, pervasive and determinant everywhere, the influence of the sea and ships: colonization, commerce, piracy, thalassocracy (and that, by the way, takes one back to Professor Myres's article on the Eusebian list of the Thalassocracies in *J.H.S.* xxvi of 1906—a generation ago, and the 'historian's' eye is as keen and his 'inquiry' as zestful as it was then).

It is, in fact, impossible to write a real review of this lecture—even if the reviewer were competent to attempt it—in fewer words than it contains. The lecturer has his way of packing a whole argument into an epithet or a phrase, of drawing upon the vocabulary of all the arts and crafts and most of the sciences, of throwing off casual hints and suggestions and opening vista after vista of speculation along side issues of his central topic, which makes it a breathless adventure even to try to follow him on the printed page. And what must it have been to listen to the spoken word?

A. F. GILES.

University of Edinburgh.

THE GEOGRAPHY OF EGYPT

JOHN BALL: *Egypt in the Classical Geographers*. Pp. vi+203; text-diagrams and 8 plates. Cairo: Government Press, 1942. 750 mills (about 15 shillings).

AFTER thirty-four years in the Egyptian Survey Department, Dr. John Ball died unexpectedly in 1941, leaving this book almost complete. It has been edited by his colleague and successor, Mr. G. W. Murray, and published by the Survey at the Government Press. The editor has only had to add a few notes and supplementary sections. Ball was not a classical scholar, but he had access to the literature, and to expert advice; he was on the other hand a mathematician, and had ample modern maps; above all he was a geographer who knew Egypt intimately, and what gives his book its value is his wise and considerate handling of his ancient predecessors, and his expert appreciation of the difference between errors of transmission and original blunders revealed by his analysis of their mistakes.

The method of the book is simple: the statements of each author are set out in full, with explanatory notes on details; the topographical results are tabulated and analysed, with instructive comparisons with those of earlier and later writers; and the special problems of the Nile branches, of methods of map-construction, and of geographical theory are treated as they emerge. For the earlier Greek writers, the general notions incorporated in Bunbury's sketch-maps are accepted without comment, and there is no criticism of current translations of the more difficult passages of Herodotus. In Hdt. ii. 16, for instance, where the boundaries of Asia and Libya are the frontiers of Egypt, to explain this as the *western* frontier is to miss the point of Herodotus' ἀνορία—you cannot distribute one country (which is a river valley) between two continents (which are abstractions); the oracle in ii. 18 stated the same doctrine conversely; any part of Libya is 'in Egypt', which uses Nile water. The criticism that in ii. 5 the

offshore shallows are exaggerated is based on Admiralty charts, not on sailing practice: the present writer, approaching in the wake of Herodotus, was 'in soundings' about 5.30 p.m., but did not anchor till the following afternoon, the delay being due to *imbat* wind, nightfall, and the sheer difficulty of approach to such a coast. The persistent confusion between the Saïte and the Tanite branches in the Delta is left unexplained (pp. 26, 30), and it would have been interesting to have a mathematician's comments on Herodotus' measurements of the Pyramids, which he dismisses (p. 19) as 'only very rough estimations'. The Labyrinth (ii. 148) he thinks has been completely quarried away after Roman times; and for the 'Moeris Question' he refers to his previous *Contributions to the Geography of Egypt* (1939). The sketch-map of the Delta (p. 24), however, is a valuable reconstruction based on the data of Herodotus.

'Very great scientific importance' is given to Eratosthenes' achievement; theoretical errors are negligible, and his mistakes arise from defective information and careless technique: a very small deviation of the *gnomon* from the vertical leading to sixfold error in the reading on the *scaphe*, and the wrong latitude assigned to Syene and the 10 per cent. overestimate of its distance from Alexandria, being principal examples.

Neither Diodorus nor Strabo has led to much original discussion, but the section on Ptolemy is a most valuable summary of his geographical method, with explanations of his chief practical defects. His relation to his predecessor Marinus is clearly explained, and his own choice of projections for the general and for the regional maps. It is left an open question whether we have any trace of maps drawn by Ptolemy himself; but this matters the less because Ptolemy's book was definitely intended to enable others to make maps like his for themselves (p. 97). His tabular matter is rightly interpreted as

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an index to the contents of these maps, not as a record of Ptolemy's own sources (p. 98) which may well have been less precise than his plottings of sites. Good reason is given for regarding the regional maps of *Codex Urbinas graecus* 82 as derived not from Ptolemy himself but from Agathodaemon; those of the Ebner Latin MS. are on a projection which Ptolemy himself does not mention at all. In the version of Ptolemy's Egyptian data (pp. 104 ff.) the longitudes have been adjusted to the meridian of Greenwich, and consequently can be transferred direct to a modern map.

The discordant stages given in the *Antonine Itinerary* are analysed and ingeniously explained. Where the recorded distance is shorter than the scaled distance on a modern map, the *Itinerary* must be wrong; where it is longer, there is the alternative that the route may have been devious, especially when river-branches or canals had to be crossed. Ball concludes that most of the discrepancies are original errors,

not due to corruption of the text. Similar criticism applied to the Peutinger Table, on the other hand, ascribes the greater errors to copyists.

To the authorities studied by Ball, which come down to George of Cyprus, only thirty-three years before the Saracen invasion, the editor adds an identification of the Egyptian goldmine in the fragmentary Turin Papyrus, with Umm Fawakhir about half-way from Quft (Koptos) to Quseir on the Red Sea. The fragments identified by Dr. Alan Gardiner in 1914 complete the proof and confirm the recognition of this document as 'the earliest geological map', for distinct colours and symbols are used to represent different kinds of rock. (Note that on p. 181, l. 4 'of thema in' is misprinted for 'of the main'.) Mr. Murray contributes also a fresh identification of Myos Hormos at Abu Sha'r, as indicated by Ptolemy, while he places Philôtera, not at Marsa Guweis, but at Marsa Gasûs.

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TIBERIUS

Charles Edward SMITH: *Tiberius and the Roman Empire*. Pp. vi+281. Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1942. Cloth, \$3.

THE figure of Tiberius still exercises its fascination over the minds of scholars. Nearly forty years ago Wilamowitz could write, 'No man to-day can make any pretensions to be treated seriously, if he thinks of Tiberius, as a ruler or as a man, as Tacitus has described him': only a few years back a scholar remarked to me, 'I fancy that the reason why Tacitus wrote as he did about the reign of Tiberius was because things were like that'. Where shall truth be found? Mr. C. E. Smith comes to his task with a wide knowledge of the literature of the past sixty or seventy years (though, oddly enough, he neglects to mention Ciaceri's *Tiberio* published in 1934, and says nothing of Pippidi), and sufficient independence to avoid 'the mistake of considering the last word as necessarily the true one'. His

book provides in the first seven chapters what amounts roughly to a chronological treatment of the reign; after which four more chapters deal with the Treason Trials, War and Peace in the Provinces, Tiberius' relations with the Senate and the administration of Italy, and Economic Conditions during the reign of Tiberius. There are fourteen pages of Bibliography and eleven of Index.

Readers will find here what may be called a recognized and conventional portrait of Tiberius, well supported by references to the ancient authors and to modern critics and writers, including many who are rather apt to be forgotten nowadays, such as Ferber, Ihne, Kessler, Lange, and A. Spengler. There are some good and clear passages, notably on the inefficiency and poverty of ideas displayed by Germanicus, and on the character of Tiberius (pp. 162-5), but for the rest the book (in my opinion) lacks grip and convincing power.

One matter that cannot be passed over, even though it be a minor one, is the large number of misprints that disfigure text and notes, and suggest hasty proof-reading. Tiberè for Tibère, Semonones for Semnones, Frejus for Fréjus, Graufenesque for Graufesenque, Martene for Martina, Philippolis for Philippopolis, Travastere for Trastevere, Artogerassa for Artagira are some among many, and Oracles II is a strange name for a Parthian monarch. There are mistakes too that should have been avoided: 'praetor' (p. 119) is an obvious slip for Praetorian Prefect; but the Roman priests did not offer vows to Tiberius (or to Nero and Drusus either), as is said on p. 125; what they did was to offer vows to the gods *pro incolumitate principis* (Ann. iv. 17); the pathetic account given in Dio lviii. 11 of the last days of Apicata cannot now be accepted as historical when set by the new fragments of the *Fasti Ostienses* (edited by L. Wickert). To say that Tacitus knew nothing of the Suetonian version of a story in which Piso was robbed of certain secret papers (p. 112) is strange in view of Ann. iii. 16, which makes Sejanus the emperor's agent. To say that Tiberius 'during the course of his reign accepted in various parts of the empire virtually all the divine honors he had refused' (p. 206, n. 85) is misleading; the existence of temples or priesthoods of Tiberius in Cyprus or Crete or Baetica simply means that the various bodies concerned set up the cult as evidence of their loyalty and enthusiasm, not that they asked Tiberius' leave or that he accepted such honours. All these may be minor inaccuracies, but they are disturbing and should not have occurred.

To some extent, therefore, it may be said that Mr. Smith has merely worked

anew over an already well-worked field, and without any particular distinction. To ascertain facts about the reign of Tiberius is good, but much of what has been done already by previous scholars can be regarded as established; what is now wanted is that the whole reign should be considered in its place as part of the history of the early Empire. Mr. Smith dismisses loose talk about a 'Reign of Terror'. Agreed. But, without inquiring too curiously into exactly how many victims have to be butchered before historians can be allowed to claim a Reign of Terror, let us ask the defenders of Tiberius, after they have done their utmost to minimize the number of executions, whether they are still easy in mind. How does the total of penalties in Tiberius' reign look when compared with those (say) in the reign of Augustus or of Hadrian, or even with those in the reigns of Nero and Domitian? Does it suggest a healthy state of affairs in the body politic? Take another topic: Tiberius is usually stated to have been of a more republican and aristocratic cast of mind than Augustus. But republican nobles had been brought up on a tradition of expansion and *gloria*: was Tiberius really *proferendi imperii incuriosus*? It might be held that in the creation of the *regnum Vannianum*, in the turning of Cappadocia and Commagene into provinces, in his attitude towards Nabat, Tiberius was looking forward and preparing the way for future advances, for which succeeding emperors gained the credit. What I should like to see is some treatment of these and similar topics, and to find Tiberius' reign considered not merely in itself but as a part of the whole history of the Empire in the first century.

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ITALIC TOMBS

Edith Hall DOHAN: *Italic Tomb-Groups in the University Museum*. Pp. 114; 56 collotype plates, 69 figures in text. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press (London: Milford), 1942. Cloth, 45s. 6d. net.

THE objects described in this book were found in early tombs at Narce and Vulci in 1895-6. The excavations were conducted with a certain care, and by painstaking examination of inventories, record-photographs, and other

material the author has been able to put together an account of the tombs and tomb-groups which must be trustworthy in all essentials. The objects themselves have been studied with the greatest precision, museums and excavation-reports exhaustively searched for parallels. The result is a work that will remain a treasure of *loci classici* not only for important types of bronze or of clay vase, but also for the many small and puzzling miscellanea that occur in graves and are commonly neglected.

The illustrations are admirable: good photographs, well reproduced, and supplemented by neat line-blocks in the text. The whole publication is in many respects an advance on anything that has been done in this field.

The tombs belong to the seventh century B.C. and the earlier part of the sixth. Some of the Narce graves are shown to be contemporary with the Tomba del Guerriero and the Bocchoris tomb. The last chapter re-examines the chronology of these two great Tarquinian tombs, and dates them later than has sometimes been proposed: Guerriero about 680 B.C., Bocchoris about 670. According to Professor Gunn, quoted by the author, Bocchoris probably reigned about 718-712 B.C.: the fayence vase from which the tomb takes its name is said to be not Egyptian but a Phoenician imitation, and to furnish little more than a *terminus post quem*. Other evidence for the dating of the Narce tombs is provided by the occurrence of proto-Corinthian and other Corinthian vases, and of Italic imitations of these; further, by three vases which, though Italic work, seem to be derived from proto-Attic pottery. The chronology of Corinthian vases depends, as is well known, on the foundation-dates, as recorded by ancient historians, of the Greek colonies in the West; while the absolute dating of proto-Attic depends on equivalences with Corinthian. Mrs. Dohan's dates tend to be somewhat later than Payne's, and a good deal

later than Blakeway's: this accords with the experience, which must be respected, of American excavators in the Agora. As to the argument from proto-Attic, it may be pointed out that no Attic vases earlier than the last decades of the seventh century seem to have been found as yet in Italy or Sicily; this is not fatal to the view that proto-Attic influenced Italic, but it is a relevant fact.

A few details. The author writes (p. 108) that if Tomb Vulci 22, about which there is hardly any information, was a chamber-tomb, it may have been in use during the years 660-625: but if it contained the cup pl. 47, 17, an Italic imitation of Middle Corinthian (pp. 90 and 92), then it must have been in use as late as the first quarter of the sixth century, and must have been a chamber-tomb. Pl. 52, 15: near the Rosoni group (see *R[accolta] G[uglielmi]*, p. 74); Vatican 139 (Albizzati, pl. 13) is less near; the connexion with bowls like pl. 14, 14 does not seem certain. A list of vases like pl. 39, 37 is given in *R.G.*, p. 73. On 'S.O.S. vases' (pl. 51, 1-2) see *ibid.*, pp. 50-1. Manikins like those on pls. 35-6 might perhaps be named 'pot-peerers' in preference to the uncouth foreign term. That the author is right in calling pl. 52, 14 Italic is shown by the resemblance of the animals to those of the alabastra Toronto 176 and 177 (Robinson, pl. 13 and p. 52) which are certainly so. Pl. 47, 7, well compared with a vase in Tarquinia (Montelius, pl. 292, 14; also phot. Moscioni 8610, 2) is described as an 'Italic imitation of a Protocorinthian (?) jar': I see these rather as Italic hellenizations of the native biconical urn: the stages are: (1) the native urn (pl. 6, 1); (2) the same shape, but smartened somewhat, and decorated with geometric or sub-geometric patterns imitating Greek (pl. 21, 1); (3) fully hellenized, and the lower part assimilated to a Greek skyphos (pl. 47, 7).

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SHORT REVIEW

Richmond LATTIMORE: *Some Odes of Pindar, in new English Versions*. Pp. 30. Norfolk, Connecticut: New Directions (James Laughlin), 1942. Cloth, \$1 (paper, 50 c.).

To find Pindar 'The Poet of the Month' in Norfolk, Connecticut, is a pleasant surprise, and Professor Lattimore of Bryn Mawr College has done his work well. All his odes are Pythian—the first, third, fourth, eighth, and tenth—and it would be difficult to make a better choice, for these five are not especially difficult, and include Pindar's admirable earliest and latest works, as well as three splendid examples of his maturity. The translation is prose, but divided into lines

corresponding to those of the original. The language is direct and unaffected, free from even such mild archaisms as 'thou', and pleasantly rhythmical, and the versions can be read with pleasure by one who knows most of the Greek lines by heart. It is difficult for such a reviewer to guess how much they can convey to a Greekless reader, in the complete absence of explanation or commentary. It is good to learn from the dust-cover that Professor Lattimore is preparing a complete translation of all Pindar's poems.

D. S. ROBERTSON.

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BOOKS RECEIVED

Excerpts or extracts from periodicals and collections will not be included unless they are also published separately.

Argenti (P. A.) Hieronimo Giustiniani's History of Chios. Edited with an Introduction. Pp. xxxv+462. Cambridge: University Press, 1943. Cloth, 42s. net.

Boak (A. E. R.) A History of Rome to 565 A.D. Third edition. Pp. xiii+552; 13 plates, 12 maps. New York: Macmillan Company, 1943. Cloth, \$4.50.

Cooper (L.) Experiments in Education. Pp. viii+176. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press (London: Milford), 1943. Cloth, 15s. 6d. net.

Davidson (G. R.) and *Thomson* (D. B.) Small Objects from the Pnyx: I. (Hesperia: Supplement VII.) Pp. 172; 69 photographs. Princeton, N. J.: American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 1943. Paper, \$5 net.

Earp (F. R.) The Style of Sophocles. Pp. 177. Cambridge: University Press, 1943. Cloth, 10s. 6d. net.

Essays by Divers Hands, being the Transactions of the Royal Society of Literature. New Series, Vol. XX. London: Milford, 1944. Cloth, 8s. 6d. net.

Henry (R. de L.) The Late Greek Optative and its Use in the Writings of Gregory Nazianzen. (Catholic University of America Patristic Studies, No. LXVIII.) Pp. xix+108. Wash-

ington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1943. Paper, \$2.

Higham (T. F.) and *Bowra* (C. M.) From the Greek. Pp. viii+246. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1943. Cloth, 4s. 6d. net.

Knight (W. F. J.) Roman Vergil. Pp. viii+348. London: Faber, 1944. Cloth, 15s. net.

Laistner (M. L. W.) A Hand-list of Bede Manuscripts. Pp. x+168. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press (London: Milford), 1943. Cloth, 18s. 6d. net.

Marsh (F. B.) Modern Problems in the Ancient World. Pp. 123. Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1943. Cloth, \$1.

Peck (A. L.) Aristotle: Generation of Animals. With an English translation. (Loeb Classical Library.) Pp. lxxviii+608. London: Heinemann, 1943. Cloth, 10s. (leather, 12s. 6d.) net.

Prakken (D. W.) Studies in Greek Genealogical Chronology. Pp. 113. Privately printed (Lancaster Press, Lancaster, Pa.), 1943. Paper.

Robinson (T. H.) Terrot Reaveley Glover. Pp. xvi. London: Carey Press, 1944. Paper, 6d.

Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association. Volume LXXIII, 1942. Pp. vi+415+xc. Lancaster, Pa.: Lancaster Press (Oxford: Blackwell). Cloth.

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